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[Music]

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thank you

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[Music]

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welcome back everybody I hope you are

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all doing well

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and before we bring on my guests the

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usual please just keep the chat nice and

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cool Carmen collected if you do have any

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questions that you'd like me to consider

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during the interview just pop them in

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capital letters I'll do my best to to

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look at those and yeah good to see

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everyone and I hope you enjoy this

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conversation uh it's always good

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speaking with my guests so let's bring

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him in please welcome Tim McMillan

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hey good man how are you yeah not bad at

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all thank you man appreciate you being

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here yeah of course it's good it's good

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to catch up you know you you uh this is

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you're one of my favorite people so it's

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always fun when we get to kind of catch

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up and chat

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I appreciate that man well listen Tim I

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wanted to start this off by asking you

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about something that I'm sure you're

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probably sick of talking about but it's

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part four of your article devices of

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Unknown Origin and I just wondered if

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we're likely to see that anytime

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I hope so well let me hear you out there

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so I I don't want anybody to be misled

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or have any expectation when we say

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anytime soon like it's coming in the

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next month or anything like that sure uh

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because I don't believe it is it's it's

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unfortunate because when I laid that out

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um it was really always supposed to be a

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part three and then something else

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popped up that was gonna make for a part

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four that was gonna be like oh wow like

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this is gonna be huge and then it just

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the Dynamics changed a little bit the

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story didn't go away but if you're gonna

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share a really you know explosive story

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or a story that uh is going to generate

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a lot of tension or you know you've got

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to make sure you got all your ducks in a

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row and you got to be able to make sure

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you can put people on record like that

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that's a big it's a big deal with this

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one is

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um you know there's often times when you

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have to rely on unnamed sources or

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people speaking uh on background or deep

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background

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um but I've always stood by that uh

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anytime that I use that it's it's to

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give context to something that's going

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on it's never to substantiate the meat

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of the whole deal and so with this one

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it really needs it needs one or two

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people that were willing to go go on the

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record initially and then they're like

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well give me some time for XYZ and XYZ

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made sense and so that's where we are

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with that I do you know I certainly

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intend to publish it at some point I

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promise that's cool now it's good to

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know I have to ask God to ask listen I

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wanted to talk as well about what we've

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seen quite a few things happening

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recently but

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earlier I think it was earlier this week

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or towards the end of last week we saw

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Senator Kirsten gillibrand in a meeting

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with U.S intelligence directors talking

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about the current funding for the all

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domain anomaly resolution office and it

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just you know this was both within DOD

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and intelligence budgets and it just

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seemed so problematic still it's still

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not running as mandated by Congress and

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I just wondered what your thoughts were

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on what's taking them so long to get

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this thing going

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sure well it's it's not surprising I

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mean this is uh very typical with how

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the government operates and nothing

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really operates

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um

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effectively quickly with government

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especially when things aren't

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specifically allocated and so that's

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part of the problem with a lot of what

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uh you know Congress when they outline

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the different things that they the

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different expectations that they had for

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it

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um they didn't you know specifically

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allocate this amount of money is going

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to go to Arrow this is it you know this

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is is congressionally mandated to go to

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that rather they they expected those

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funds to be taken out of already uh

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appropriated funding it was going into

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different intelligence programs and

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everything and so uh that in itself

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always makes it difficult for any

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program in fact um you know people may

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recall Louis zando talking about when he

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was trying to get funding for for atip

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when that ran out when the alsap

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contract ran out he talked about they

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had secured funding then somebody stole

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it from them that's the kind of thing

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we're talking about here is there's a

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there's a pot there's a pot of gold and

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there's a whole bunch of hands they're

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trying to grab it and so I think that's

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where part of the problem is there

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there's also

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um there's some interesting

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there's some interesting political

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conflicts perhaps unsurprisingly going

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on behind the scenes uh from from what

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I've gathered from people you know in

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fact you know I I heard from people who

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work at the Pentagon who who are

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familiar with the program who expressing

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being a little dismayed to hear uh

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elected leaders requesting more funding

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or saying they needed more funding

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because uh they were under they're under

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the interpretation that Arrow does have

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a budget and it's in fact only spent a

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very small

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margin of that budget in fact that they

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have uh roughly 85 percent of their

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budget still unspent and so they were

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dismayed with it now

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uh you know I ask you know this goes

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into when are you gonna put print part

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four and and you're like well Jim damn

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why haven't you published an article

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share this like why is Arrow begging for

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money they haven't spent it is this is

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another one of those instances where you

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know I asked I said wow that's that's

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impressive can is there any

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documentation you can give me to back

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that up somehow you know you show me

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take a picture of the budget and

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everything and they said they you know

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they can't do that that crosses the line

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of classification and I said okay

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understandable but therefore I say all

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that to say that's what I'm being told

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from people but everybody has political

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agendas and I think we're seeing that

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more and more

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um really in the last couple months

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you're seeing more and more of some

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political agendas coming out of the

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Pentagon and with lawmakers when it

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comes to the topic

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yeah what about the you know the

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liaising with other agencies do you

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think that's starting to work I mean we

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saw again senator gillibrand in a

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meeting with Four Star General Anthony

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cotton talking about stratcom and the

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co-coms and their assistants that you

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know it just seems that this is just

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really not fully operational and it's

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it's Dragon so is that sort of the same

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thing it's just it's just time

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it's time and it's just the the the

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really Byzantine biocracy that goes on

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to the government and so uh some people

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may have seen that I really I commented

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that I thought her questioning of

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stratcom uh was great because you know

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uh General cotton tried to defer to

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North comic couple number you have to

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ask North com but it was nice that she

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asked them because stratcom is in charge

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of the global intelligence or

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reconnaissance Synergy for the entire

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Department of Defense whereas North com

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is just in charge of the continental

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United States and its territories so you

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know what she was saying without saying

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it it's kind of funny when you put these

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lawmakers on on on the the box there is

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that hey I expect this to be something

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that you take a global interest in

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because if you're only if we're relying

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on North com we're only looking at the

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U.S but I don't expect that because if

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they're not coming from the us where the

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heck are they coming from should we try

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to figure that out so I thought that was

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good but you're right I think you're

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correct and kind of uh and I commented

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on that in it uh General Cotton's kind

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of where he was a little taken back by

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and even kind of smirked a little bit

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um but uh you could tell that you know

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he said that they had Liaisons I'm sure

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they do but but agencies are so

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territorial

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and so protective of their assets and

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what they want to do you know it's like

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kids not want to be told what to do and

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it's even Amplified when you're talking

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about uh people who are in senior

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executive leadership roles who are have

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gotten there by Presidential nomination

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or their generals who spent 40 years and

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they've got this rank I mean you know

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they've flown around in private jets uh

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and suddenly somebody's telling what to

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do and so uh it's very difficult I think

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that's one reason why and I've always

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agreed with it that Christopher melon

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has always said he felt like there

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needed to be a structure similar to what

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they did with the Special Operations

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Command we actually had a combatant

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command now that's a that's a big ticket

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to ask for to have a UFO combatant

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command but a similar structure where

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you have representatives from all of

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these different areas and components of

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government actually working in the same

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building under the same umbrella really

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gives you a lot more muscle and

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unfortunately Arrow doesn't have that

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and I have always said that that's going

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to make that job extremely difficult for

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the foreseeable future in my opinion as

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long as it kind of exists how it is and

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and bear in mind we're just talking

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about the Department of Defense that's

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not getting into there there's a vast

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array of federal agencies from the FBI

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to the Department of energy all these

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different places that the dod has no

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jurisdiction over but all of them

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Homeland Security the Coast Guard all of

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them can have influence into this and

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and frankly probably have data or some

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information to share it's just getting

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those resources together is extremely

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difficult yeah no I can imagine and and

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I think Senator gillibrand also

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mentioned something about norad's senses

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being quite old as well and that could

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be something that needs upgrading in

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order to really help gather better data

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well that was a I'm glad you brought it

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up you reminded me because I I chuckled

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when she said that because it goes into

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that dance that kind of hidden little

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game that lawmakers and and people uh in

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executive power positions play but she

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did she made it she expressed her intent

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the distraction on extract common ball

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and she followed that up by bringing up

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the the older air defense systems and

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that's kind of a subtle way of saying

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hey this is I expect you to be looking

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at this globally by the way won't you be

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coming to me in a couple of months or

276
00:10:34,490 --> 00:10:33,540
weeks here with your new defense budget

277
00:10:36,650 --> 00:10:34,500
and you're going to be asking for a

278
00:10:38,630 --> 00:10:36,660
bunch of money for Radars aren't you hmm

279
00:10:41,210 --> 00:10:38,640
okay well I just told you what I wanted

280
00:10:43,490 --> 00:10:41,220
so all right you know thanks for your

281
00:10:44,690 --> 00:10:43,500
question so it's just kind of veiled way

282
00:10:45,889 --> 00:10:44,700
of saying it's a give and take

283
00:10:48,170 --> 00:10:45,899
relationship

284
00:10:50,030 --> 00:10:48,180
yeah absolutely and we've got a question

285
00:10:52,430 --> 00:10:50,040
here from Dan which he highlights a good

286
00:10:54,889 --> 00:10:52,440
point says often we see responses to any

287
00:10:56,690 --> 00:10:54,899
bit of UAP video or photo with we have

288
00:10:58,910 --> 00:10:56,700
the best sensors on this why can't we

289
00:11:01,130 --> 00:10:58,920
figure it out do we have all the best

290
00:11:04,250 --> 00:11:01,140
sensors pointing at all places at all

291
00:11:07,790 --> 00:11:04,260
times no oh yeah we don't you know

292
00:11:11,269 --> 00:11:07,800
clearly we don't uh and in in particular

293
00:11:12,910 --> 00:11:11,279
and I had a conversation about this uh

294
00:11:15,290 --> 00:11:12,920
on Twitter the other day

295
00:11:18,410 --> 00:11:15,300
where uh there was some conversation

296
00:11:20,990 --> 00:11:18,420
about uh the lack there of of different

297
00:11:24,009 --> 00:11:21,000
videos or perhaps identifications of

298
00:11:26,810 --> 00:11:24,019
objects in particular this was the 2019

299
00:11:28,069 --> 00:11:26,820
Events off the west coast and one thing

300
00:11:31,610 --> 00:11:28,079
that I pointed out is that it's

301
00:11:34,550 --> 00:11:31,620
important to to realize that uh for the

302
00:11:36,290 --> 00:11:34,560
most part the imagery systems that are

303
00:11:38,870 --> 00:11:36,300
on Military systems especially those

304
00:11:41,530 --> 00:11:38,880
naval ships or even aircraft uh their

305
00:11:44,870 --> 00:11:41,540
purpose-built single mission

306
00:11:46,850 --> 00:11:44,880
for that weapon system so you know the

307
00:11:49,069 --> 00:11:46,860
the targeting pods that we've seen some

308
00:11:53,210 --> 00:11:49,079
great videos like the uh the Nimitz

309
00:11:55,130 --> 00:11:53,220
video or the um the gimbal uh you know

310
00:11:57,290 --> 00:11:55,140
we've seen those were used to capture

311
00:11:58,730 --> 00:11:57,300
these videos but that's not what those

312
00:12:00,350 --> 00:11:58,740
systems are designed for and in fact

313
00:12:02,329 --> 00:12:00,360
that's not really their best purpose

314
00:12:04,670 --> 00:12:02,339
their targeting systems used for ground

315
00:12:06,590 --> 00:12:04,680
engagements air to ground targeting uh

316
00:12:08,329 --> 00:12:06,600
missile engagement they've since been

317
00:12:10,550 --> 00:12:08,339
kind of co-opted

318
00:12:12,230 --> 00:12:10,560
um for air-to-air intelligence gathering

319
00:12:14,030 --> 00:12:12,240
but these systems aren't designed for it

320
00:12:15,530 --> 00:12:14,040
and so there's very problematic Dan

321
00:12:17,569 --> 00:12:15,540
brings up a good point that we don't

322
00:12:20,150 --> 00:12:17,579
have the best systems pointed everywhere

323
00:12:22,550 --> 00:12:20,160
we don't have them necessarily tuned to

324
00:12:24,949 --> 00:12:22,560
what they need to be tuned to I think in

325
00:12:27,290 --> 00:12:24,959
a lot of times and they aren't really

326
00:12:30,050 --> 00:12:27,300
designed for capturing the types of

327
00:12:31,730 --> 00:12:30,060
intelligence that seems to be escaping

328
00:12:32,810 --> 00:12:31,740
things when we're looking at this

329
00:12:34,610 --> 00:12:32,820
because there's always seems to be

330
00:12:36,050 --> 00:12:34,620
something missing you know maybe you've

331
00:12:37,430 --> 00:12:36,060
getting the video but you don't you

332
00:12:38,990 --> 00:12:37,440
don't get other sensor data there's

333
00:12:42,530 --> 00:12:39,000
something there's a veil there that's

334
00:12:43,910 --> 00:12:42,540
missing and so you know it's obvious

335
00:12:47,030 --> 00:12:43,920
that you're dealing with at times

336
00:12:48,710 --> 00:12:47,040
something that is abstract it's outside

337
00:12:50,269 --> 00:12:48,720
of the balance of what those systems

338
00:12:52,790 --> 00:12:50,279
were designed for I think that's

339
00:12:55,190 --> 00:12:52,800
problematic I think it's problematic for

340
00:12:57,829 --> 00:12:55,200
understanding UAP it's problematic for

341
00:12:59,090 --> 00:12:57,839
the very example that we don't have data

342
00:13:01,610 --> 00:12:59,100
on it that's exactly what your

343
00:13:04,730 --> 00:13:01,620
adversaries do they want to get in those

344
00:13:07,129 --> 00:13:04,740
gaps and so it is problematic but but

345
00:13:10,670 --> 00:13:07,139
Dan brings up a great point we don't and

346
00:13:12,949 --> 00:13:10,680
I think we we've seen that uh very that

347
00:13:15,350 --> 00:13:12,959
that's really been reinforced in the

348
00:13:17,269 --> 00:13:15,360
last couple months

349
00:13:19,069 --> 00:13:17,279
I appreciate the answer and I think Dan

350
00:13:20,930 --> 00:13:19,079
says that too yeah

351
00:13:22,850 --> 00:13:20,940
um and you mentioned that the 2019 drone

352
00:13:24,170 --> 00:13:22,860
swarms that we're still here you know

353
00:13:25,970 --> 00:13:24,180
come back into the conversation every

354
00:13:28,550 --> 00:13:25,980
now and again and I just wondered where

355
00:13:30,470 --> 00:13:28,560
your head's at with that case currently

356
00:13:34,730 --> 00:13:30,480
with the uh we're talking about the West

357
00:13:37,250 --> 00:13:34,740
Coast the 20 was it 29 2019 yeah yeah

358
00:13:41,090 --> 00:13:37,260
you know I don't know you know I think

359
00:13:43,550 --> 00:13:41,100
that uh I'm well aware that there there

360
00:13:46,129 --> 00:13:43,560
has been instances where

361
00:13:48,290 --> 00:13:46,139
um foreign governments have tried to use

362
00:13:51,530 --> 00:13:48,300
drones namely in this case China before

363
00:13:53,629 --> 00:13:51,540
both spying on uh mainland United States

364
00:13:56,090 --> 00:13:53,639
and also just harassment intimidation

365
00:13:58,850 --> 00:13:56,100
little nuisance type stuff so I know

366
00:14:00,829 --> 00:13:58,860
that goes on and I think offhand when

367
00:14:02,690 --> 00:14:00,839
you hear about

368
00:14:04,490 --> 00:14:02,700
um some of the things that that were

369
00:14:06,470 --> 00:14:04,500
going on or what they were seeing it's

370
00:14:08,470 --> 00:14:06,480
certainly you know it makes me lean

371
00:14:12,110 --> 00:14:08,480
towards this was drone swarm technology

372
00:14:14,210 --> 00:14:12,120
this was some type of uh likely in my

373
00:14:16,550 --> 00:14:14,220
opinion perhaps ferreting is what it's

374
00:14:18,650 --> 00:14:16,560
called it's where you're intentionally

375
00:14:20,329 --> 00:14:18,660
uh coming at the ships you're trying to

376
00:14:21,889 --> 00:14:20,339
make them turn on their air defense

377
00:14:23,690 --> 00:14:21,899
systems because you want to soak up all

378
00:14:25,730 --> 00:14:23,700
those emissions you want to know how

379
00:14:28,069 --> 00:14:25,740
they defend themselves so you can defeat

380
00:14:29,990 --> 00:14:28,079
them if you need to and so to a certain

381
00:14:31,069 --> 00:14:30,000
degree that answers why a lot of people

382
00:14:32,810 --> 00:14:31,079
why didn't they shoot them out of the

383
00:14:35,329 --> 00:14:32,820
sky or why didn't they use this this or

384
00:14:36,530 --> 00:14:35,339
this system and those kind of situation

385
00:14:38,750 --> 00:14:36,540
is the worst thing you could do is

386
00:14:40,790 --> 00:14:38,760
overreact the worst thing you do is go

387
00:14:44,930 --> 00:14:40,800
to quarters and man the battle station

388
00:14:47,030 --> 00:14:44,940
because now your adversary has an exact

389
00:14:50,210 --> 00:14:47,040
image of what your posture is in that

390
00:14:52,250 --> 00:14:50,220
situation so all of it sounds like that

391
00:14:54,949 --> 00:14:52,260
but there are aspects of it that that

392
00:14:57,650 --> 00:14:54,959
you know don't seem to make sense I

393
00:14:59,150 --> 00:14:57,660
think uh you know we've heard that uh

394
00:15:01,970 --> 00:14:59,160
you know I've looked at the case

395
00:15:04,069 --> 00:15:01,980
admittedly not extremely intimately but

396
00:15:06,350 --> 00:15:04,079
enough to be aware that it's certainly

397
00:15:08,210 --> 00:15:06,360
difficult to narrow down a point of

398
00:15:10,310 --> 00:15:08,220
origin for where these forms could have

399
00:15:12,350 --> 00:15:10,320
been coming from there's certain the

400
00:15:14,569 --> 00:15:12,360
descriptions of them exceeding the

401
00:15:16,790 --> 00:15:14,579
capabilities of normal drones in terms

402
00:15:19,610 --> 00:15:16,800
of energy use so you have all of that

403
00:15:22,610 --> 00:15:19,620
going where you know what are we dealing

404
00:15:24,710 --> 00:15:22,620
with and I've uh you know I've spoken to

405
00:15:28,009 --> 00:15:24,720
Sailors who were on various ships out

406
00:15:29,629 --> 00:15:28,019
there and I've heard it's it has in no

407
00:15:31,910 --> 00:15:29,639
way clarified things because I've heard

408
00:15:34,250 --> 00:15:31,920
from them oh it was drones you know I

409
00:15:37,430 --> 00:15:34,260
could hear them or man no way that was

410
00:15:38,810 --> 00:15:37,440
drones because you know X Y and Z it

411
00:15:41,689 --> 00:15:38,820
didn't this didn't happen at this time

412
00:15:45,350 --> 00:15:41,699
so no way to do the drug so it's like

413
00:15:47,329 --> 00:15:45,360
so I'm every bit as confused perhaps

414
00:15:49,490 --> 00:15:47,339
just the general public I think it just

415
00:15:52,129 --> 00:15:49,500
goes into the kind of gray basket of

416
00:15:54,410 --> 00:15:52,139
there's not enough information there's

417
00:15:56,629 --> 00:15:54,420
there there's nothing that I have seen

418
00:15:59,569 --> 00:15:56,639
that exhibits any of the characteristics

419
00:16:02,689 --> 00:15:59,579
that I tend to to categorize with quote

420
00:16:05,449 --> 00:16:02,699
UAP which is exotic really like stuff

421
00:16:07,610 --> 00:16:05,459
that goes okay that there ain't nothing

422
00:16:08,870 --> 00:16:07,620
there's no way that that's that's not

423
00:16:10,610 --> 00:16:08,880
real

424
00:16:12,470 --> 00:16:10,620
um so I haven't heard anything like that

425
00:16:14,750 --> 00:16:12,480
but at the same time I can't

426
00:16:16,670 --> 00:16:14,760
you know I can't even go to a high

427
00:16:18,470 --> 00:16:16,680
degree of certainty and say yeah I

428
00:16:21,829 --> 00:16:18,480
definitely think it was this so it's

429
00:16:23,269 --> 00:16:21,839
just it's interesting yeah no it does

430
00:16:25,129 --> 00:16:23,279
feel like we kind of hit a wall with it

431
00:16:26,990 --> 00:16:25,139
and we just need more information or

432
00:16:29,810 --> 00:16:27,000
data to be able to take that any further

433
00:16:32,210 --> 00:16:29,820
so no I appreciate your answer uh now

434
00:16:34,370 --> 00:16:32,220
obviously another Hot Topic that's been

435
00:16:36,769 --> 00:16:34,380
kind of on the focus recently is this

436
00:16:39,590 --> 00:16:36,779
potential crash retrieval programs

437
00:16:41,569 --> 00:16:39,600
Legacy programs and you know there have

438
00:16:43,610 --> 00:16:41,579
been calls this past week for the U.S

439
00:16:45,769 --> 00:16:43,620
Senate committee on Appropriations who

440
00:16:47,389 --> 00:16:45,779
have jurisdiction on spending to

441
00:16:49,310 --> 00:16:47,399
actually order these special access

442
00:16:51,769 --> 00:16:49,320
program audit these special access

443
00:16:53,329 --> 00:16:51,779
programs such as ones potentially held

444
00:16:55,189 --> 00:16:53,339
at Lockheed Martin

445
00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:55,199
I mean to ask these questions these

446
00:16:58,790 --> 00:16:56,759
contractors do you think that they could

447
00:17:01,370 --> 00:16:58,800
get answers from them like what what's

448
00:17:03,949 --> 00:17:01,380
the deal there is the gray areas in that

449
00:17:06,710 --> 00:17:03,959
oh man see this is another great area

450
00:17:09,110 --> 00:17:06,720
where it depends on what time of the the

451
00:17:12,049 --> 00:17:09,120
month or year you catch me on for my

452
00:17:14,270 --> 00:17:12,059
opinion uh I'm in uh what are those

453
00:17:16,189 --> 00:17:14,280
cycles of opinion where

454
00:17:18,949 --> 00:17:16,199
I tend to think that the probability

455
00:17:21,710 --> 00:17:18,959
that we have uh you know retrieved

456
00:17:24,470 --> 00:17:21,720
materials from UAP or something that's

457
00:17:26,329 --> 00:17:24,480
really exotic it's low now if you asked

458
00:17:27,710 --> 00:17:26,339
me a month from now I might tell you the

459
00:17:29,090 --> 00:17:27,720
exact opposite it's interesting I was

460
00:17:31,130 --> 00:17:29,100
just having this conversation with two

461
00:17:33,289 --> 00:17:31,140
real good friends earlier today where

462
00:17:35,330 --> 00:17:33,299
they were kind of asking me or we were

463
00:17:36,890 --> 00:17:35,340
bouncing off the the same kind of

464
00:17:40,250 --> 00:17:36,900
question you just asked and I was like

465
00:17:41,750 --> 00:17:40,260
nah there's no way no way uh but they

466
00:17:43,430 --> 00:17:41,760
you know kind of slow you down you make

467
00:17:45,110 --> 00:17:43,440
you think of it um

468
00:17:47,210 --> 00:17:45,120
because there are instances that you're

469
00:17:50,210 --> 00:17:47,220
like man that how do you explain that

470
00:17:51,770 --> 00:17:50,220
for me it's always been listening to

471
00:17:54,409 --> 00:17:51,780
some of those old recordings of Jesse

472
00:17:56,330 --> 00:17:54,419
Marcel from Roswell where I'm like

473
00:17:58,070 --> 00:17:56,340
you know I'm an investigator man that's

474
00:18:01,430 --> 00:17:58,080
hard you know that's one of the only

475
00:18:04,850 --> 00:18:01,440
instances where I can point to say okay

476
00:18:08,630 --> 00:18:04,860
that is a person who is saying firsthand

477
00:18:10,850 --> 00:18:08,640
I held this in my hand I saw this with

478
00:18:12,950 --> 00:18:10,860
my own eyes whereas most of these

479
00:18:14,930 --> 00:18:12,960
stories are somebody told me somebody

480
00:18:17,270 --> 00:18:14,940
told me it's very very rare that she at

481
00:18:19,850 --> 00:18:17,280
first hand so all right to caveat that

482
00:18:22,070 --> 00:18:19,860
do I think that it could be

483
00:18:24,110 --> 00:18:22,080
um you know it could be beneficial to

484
00:18:27,529 --> 00:18:24,120
you know could it be fruitful could you

485
00:18:29,510 --> 00:18:27,539
see anything I don't know and the reason

486
00:18:32,390 --> 00:18:29,520
I say that is an abnormal circumstances

487
00:18:34,669 --> 00:18:32,400
maybe you know we when push comes to

488
00:18:36,590 --> 00:18:34,679
shove they've uncovered you know some

489
00:18:38,330 --> 00:18:36,600
really dark deep Secrets throughout the

490
00:18:40,549 --> 00:18:38,340
years when it comes to let's say MK

491
00:18:42,010 --> 00:18:40,559
Ultra you know say hey sure as heck

492
00:18:44,330 --> 00:18:42,020
didn't want that to come out you know

493
00:18:46,669 --> 00:18:44,340
kidnapping people from brothels and

494
00:18:49,970 --> 00:18:46,679
dosing with LSD but it's still able to

495
00:18:52,130 --> 00:18:49,980
come out uh you know Iran Contra yellow

496
00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:52,140
fruit the list goes on of these things

497
00:18:56,870 --> 00:18:55,140
that actually got people in prison uh

498
00:18:58,850 --> 00:18:56,880
but you know this is something I brought

499
00:19:01,490 --> 00:18:58,860
up when I was speaking to two guys

500
00:19:04,549 --> 00:19:01,500
earlier is I'm like man

501
00:19:06,289 --> 00:19:04,559
who's ever in charge of that secrecy if

502
00:19:09,770 --> 00:19:06,299
there's really something they're hiding

503
00:19:12,289 --> 00:19:09,780
it like there I mean that's some Legacy

504
00:19:13,789 --> 00:19:12,299
you know generational that is that is

505
00:19:15,890 --> 00:19:13,799
the best secrecy I've ever heard from

506
00:19:18,710 --> 00:19:15,900
because it's never come out to been

507
00:19:20,810 --> 00:19:18,720
fruition so it's very difficult to say

508
00:19:23,570 --> 00:19:20,820
well will that be successful in

509
00:19:26,990 --> 00:19:23,580
uncovering these secrets because

510
00:19:28,850 --> 00:19:27,000
I don't I nothing else has been you know

511
00:19:30,770 --> 00:19:28,860
like that's such a you know if that

512
00:19:33,650 --> 00:19:30,780
exists it would appear to exist in such

513
00:19:35,810 --> 00:19:33,660
a degree of secrecy that exceeds what

514
00:19:38,029 --> 00:19:35,820
I'm familiar with you know not could

515
00:19:41,150 --> 00:19:38,039
speak to what I would I you know it's an

516
00:19:43,190 --> 00:19:41,160
entire whole other side of it and now if

517
00:19:46,070 --> 00:19:43,200
you're talking about things that are

518
00:19:47,990 --> 00:19:46,080
potentially improprietary property so

519
00:19:50,330 --> 00:19:48,000
let's say you know because I've argued

520
00:19:52,130 --> 00:19:50,340
this point well you know perhaps even

521
00:19:53,870 --> 00:19:52,140
pose this kind of hypothetical scenario

522
00:19:56,630 --> 00:19:53,880
that you did have crash you know let's

523
00:19:58,850 --> 00:19:56,640
say Roswell was an alien spaceship it

524
00:20:00,110 --> 00:19:58,860
crashed and this was uh something that

525
00:20:02,450 --> 00:20:00,120
was in possession the atomic energy

526
00:20:04,430 --> 00:20:02,460
commission uh back through the 40s into

527
00:20:06,770 --> 00:20:04,440
the 1970s which was the civilian

528
00:20:08,570 --> 00:20:06,780
Administration but before the adoption

529
00:20:11,150 --> 00:20:08,580
of the Department of energy which became

530
00:20:13,549 --> 00:20:11,160
a federal agency this this property was

531
00:20:16,669 --> 00:20:13,559
transitioned into Private Industry

532
00:20:19,130 --> 00:20:16,679
become proprietary property so if it's

533
00:20:21,710 --> 00:20:19,140
Lockheed Martin let's say or anyone else

534
00:20:24,049 --> 00:20:21,720
Boeing Walmart doesn't matter if it's

535
00:20:25,310 --> 00:20:24,059
their prioritary for property uh the

536
00:20:30,110 --> 00:20:25,320
government is is actually legally

537
00:20:32,510 --> 00:20:30,120
forbidden from disclosing that so in

538
00:20:36,169 --> 00:20:32,520
that in those cases you know they they

539
00:20:37,909 --> 00:20:36,179
wouldn't be able to unless uh you know

540
00:20:40,130 --> 00:20:37,919
there's all sorts of legal things too

541
00:20:40,970 --> 00:20:40,140
that's just it's a really

542
00:20:44,270 --> 00:20:40,980
right

543
00:20:46,730 --> 00:20:44,280
it's a maze because there's legal ways

544
00:20:50,029 --> 00:20:46,740
like if you really thought you you could

545
00:20:51,590 --> 00:20:50,039
you know potentially enforce search uh

546
00:20:52,610 --> 00:20:51,600
search warrants you know you could try

547
00:20:55,610 --> 00:20:52,620
to seize this property International

548
00:20:59,450 --> 00:20:55,620
Security type thing it's just it's it's

549
00:21:01,610 --> 00:20:59,460
a it's a maze it's amazing and it it

550
00:21:02,990 --> 00:21:01,620
also brought up the legal side that if

551
00:21:04,490 --> 00:21:03,000
you know a good friend of mine who's a

552
00:21:07,130 --> 00:21:04,500
lawyer I was speaking with today brought

553
00:21:09,529 --> 00:21:07,140
up the the aspect that how would these

554
00:21:11,690 --> 00:21:09,539
companies mitigate that if they had that

555
00:21:13,250 --> 00:21:11,700
because they're legally beholden to

556
00:21:16,070 --> 00:21:13,260
their shareholders

557
00:21:17,630 --> 00:21:16,080
and so if they've been hiding this you

558
00:21:19,850 --> 00:21:17,640
know they're legally on the hook so

559
00:21:22,850 --> 00:21:19,860
there's all these really nuanced things

560
00:21:24,169 --> 00:21:22,860
that certainly doesn't make me believe

561
00:21:26,330 --> 00:21:24,179
that just because you pass a

562
00:21:27,409 --> 00:21:26,340
congressional bill that anyone would go

563
00:21:29,870 --> 00:21:27,419
ah

564
00:21:32,149 --> 00:21:29,880
you got me now all right and come on in

565
00:21:33,230 --> 00:21:32,159
wheel out the bodies everybody here here

566
00:21:36,710 --> 00:21:33,240
they go

567
00:21:38,930 --> 00:21:36,720
so I don't know I you know it's I'm

568
00:21:41,690 --> 00:21:38,940
uh I'd like to say I'm optimistic but

569
00:21:44,690 --> 00:21:41,700
I'm not I'm pessimistically skeptical

570
00:21:46,130 --> 00:21:44,700
but man I would I certainly would not

571
00:21:48,350 --> 00:21:46,140
try to explain in a way to diminish it

572
00:21:51,110 --> 00:21:48,360
if it comes true I want it to come true

573
00:21:53,810 --> 00:21:51,120
let me put it that way cool yeah I know

574
00:21:55,730 --> 00:21:53,820
what you mean got another great question

575
00:21:58,370 --> 00:21:55,740
here this one's from Jay Allen he says

576
00:22:01,549 --> 00:21:58,380
uh Tim's theory on complete silence from

577
00:22:03,289 --> 00:22:01,559
the U.S Air Force uh on UAP I'm Korea

578
00:22:05,570 --> 00:22:03,299
Air Force and UFO is still a hostile

579
00:22:08,510 --> 00:22:05,580
topic here nobody talks about it to the

580
00:22:11,750 --> 00:22:08,520
point of looking away on purpose

581
00:22:14,450 --> 00:22:11,760
yeah yeah no that's very true and very

582
00:22:16,970 --> 00:22:14,460
true with the Air Force um I know

583
00:22:19,430 --> 00:22:16,980
because I I live on an Air Force Base

584
00:22:20,690 --> 00:22:19,440
and so I'm very I'm surrounded I've come

585
00:22:25,130 --> 00:22:20,700
in contact with the Air Force all the

586
00:22:26,270 --> 00:22:25,140
time and it's certainly a informal you

587
00:22:28,730 --> 00:22:26,280
know there's never anything I've come

588
00:22:30,350 --> 00:22:28,740
across that's formal per se you know

589
00:22:33,890 --> 00:22:30,360
I've never seen a formal policy but it's

590
00:22:35,630 --> 00:22:33,900
certainly informal and and honestly in

591
00:22:37,430 --> 00:22:35,640
any type of Institutions whether it's

592
00:22:39,710 --> 00:22:37,440
the military or the government informal

593
00:22:41,630 --> 00:22:39,720
policies are frankly more stable than

594
00:22:44,210 --> 00:22:41,640
formal ones because they're not written

595
00:22:45,830 --> 00:22:44,220
down so they're kind of slippery and so

596
00:22:48,890 --> 00:22:45,840
there's certainly particularly with the

597
00:22:49,490 --> 00:22:48,900
Air Forces it's informal policy

598
00:22:52,669 --> 00:22:49,500
um

599
00:22:55,789 --> 00:22:52,679
that you don't discuss it and that you

600
00:22:57,230 --> 00:22:55,799
on top of that that if you discuss it

601
00:22:58,789 --> 00:22:57,240
you know the only people that discuss it

602
00:23:01,490 --> 00:22:58,799
are the people who you know Live at Home

603
00:23:03,710 --> 00:23:01,500
in their mom's basement and you know

604
00:23:05,390 --> 00:23:03,720
the play video games you read Comics all

605
00:23:07,190 --> 00:23:05,400
that you know don't worry about that

606
00:23:09,830 --> 00:23:07,200
let's go let's go get ready to defeat

607
00:23:12,230 --> 00:23:09,840
the Russians and so

608
00:23:15,049 --> 00:23:12,240
um you know that's kind of the tone for

609
00:23:17,330 --> 00:23:15,059
it and it just kind of sets the standard

610
00:23:19,970 --> 00:23:17,340
for what's acceptable and unacceptable

611
00:23:21,710 --> 00:23:19,980
Behavior it's very very interesting

612
00:23:24,950 --> 00:23:21,720
because you'll you'll certainly come

613
00:23:27,710 --> 00:23:24,960
across people who are career uh you know

614
00:23:30,830 --> 00:23:27,720
Air Force pilots career Airmen uh career

615
00:23:33,169 --> 00:23:30,840
military personnel who uh will share

616
00:23:34,789 --> 00:23:33,179
that oh yeah you know I I saw this or

617
00:23:37,909 --> 00:23:34,799
this at one point Dom and it's always

618
00:23:40,250 --> 00:23:37,919
like what did you do hey they didn't

619
00:23:41,990 --> 00:23:40,260
know what to do in terms of reporting it

620
00:23:43,850 --> 00:23:42,000
was until recently do they kind of

621
00:23:46,370 --> 00:23:43,860
adopted these different protocols did

622
00:23:50,090 --> 00:23:46,380
you have a formal process for reporting

623
00:23:52,010 --> 00:23:50,100
it and so what do you do you know how do

624
00:23:53,450 --> 00:23:52,020
you report it now I'll just say that

625
00:23:54,950 --> 00:23:53,460
we do anything you know I look at my

626
00:23:55,789 --> 00:23:54,960
co-pilot look at my crew chief and we're

627
00:23:58,669 --> 00:23:55,799
like

628
00:24:01,570 --> 00:23:58,679
I don't know man crazy man just kept

629
00:24:04,730 --> 00:24:01,580
moving and I think that that's kind of

630
00:24:07,430 --> 00:24:04,740
institutionally uh goes out there and

631
00:24:09,310 --> 00:24:07,440
the stigma behind it is real and so that

632
00:24:12,470 --> 00:24:09,320
that definitely

633
00:24:14,029 --> 00:24:12,480
affects how that topic is treated but

634
00:24:16,490 --> 00:24:14,039
the Air Force in particular and I think

635
00:24:19,250 --> 00:24:16,500
if we looked at it historically speaking

636
00:24:21,770 --> 00:24:19,260
I think that some of that uh the Air

637
00:24:23,630 --> 00:24:21,780
Force maybe perhaps feels like for for

638
00:24:25,669 --> 00:24:23,640
many years they they had a [\h__\h] Burger

639
00:24:29,210 --> 00:24:25,679
on their plate with the blue book and

640
00:24:31,250 --> 00:24:29,220
all of this and uh you know they they

641
00:24:34,010 --> 00:24:31,260
looked at it for decades and walked away

642
00:24:36,409 --> 00:24:34,020
with no real answers and I think there's

643
00:24:39,770 --> 00:24:36,419
so much aversion to wanting to go back

644
00:24:40,909 --> 00:24:39,780
to that and I think that that still it's

645
00:24:43,909 --> 00:24:40,919
kind of like this ingrained

646
00:24:46,549 --> 00:24:43,919
institutional trauma that's just gone

647
00:24:50,990 --> 00:24:46,559
through with it and so I think they

648
00:24:52,370 --> 00:24:51,000
don't want to be a part of that again

649
00:24:53,330 --> 00:24:52,380
well that's a good answer I appreciate

650
00:24:54,590 --> 00:24:53,340
it I've never I've never really thought

651
00:24:57,649 --> 00:24:54,600
about it from that angle but that makes

652
00:24:59,210 --> 00:24:57,659
absolute sense it's it's hard I mean

653
00:25:01,909 --> 00:24:59,220
when you're looking at it when you're

654
00:25:03,470 --> 00:25:01,919
supposed to be the premier air power in

655
00:25:05,690 --> 00:25:03,480
the world you're supposed to be the the

656
00:25:07,610 --> 00:25:05,700
one that everybody looks to and you

657
00:25:09,529 --> 00:25:07,620
don't have answers and you invest time

658
00:25:12,110 --> 00:25:09,539
and money into it

659
00:25:13,730 --> 00:25:12,120
um it's hard and and I think that that

660
00:25:15,950 --> 00:25:13,740
even plays into it when we go into the

661
00:25:18,289 --> 00:25:15,960
invest money and time into it is you

662
00:25:19,810 --> 00:25:18,299
look at it as leadership starts to go

663
00:25:23,210 --> 00:25:19,820
man

664
00:25:26,409 --> 00:25:23,220
I need more f-35s I need this this and

665
00:25:30,529 --> 00:25:26,419
this man you know this is what I need

666
00:25:32,690 --> 00:25:30,539
this frustrates me and I don't know how

667
00:25:34,190 --> 00:25:32,700
to attack this I don't know how to

668
00:25:37,010 --> 00:25:34,200
defeat this I don't know how to address

669
00:25:39,649 --> 00:25:37,020
this so it's not real and so I think

670
00:25:42,470 --> 00:25:39,659
that that that has a huge influence and

671
00:25:45,350 --> 00:25:42,480
because for so many years it was the Air

672
00:25:47,690 --> 00:25:45,360
Force's problem and that they just

673
00:25:49,070 --> 00:25:47,700
really really want to avoid it becoming

674
00:25:50,810 --> 00:25:49,080
their problem I mean they have done a

675
00:25:52,909 --> 00:25:50,820
phenomenal job staying out at the

676
00:25:55,810 --> 00:25:52,919
spotlight in the last couple years I got

677
00:26:00,169 --> 00:25:57,950
and sticking with the Air Force we've

678
00:26:02,210 --> 00:26:00,179
got a question here from your colleague

679
00:26:03,529 --> 00:26:02,220
and our friend Christopher plane

680
00:26:05,149 --> 00:26:03,539
um he says hey Tim is there any

681
00:26:07,250 --> 00:26:05,159
realistic scenario where the bulk of

682
00:26:09,169 --> 00:26:07,260
current UFO reports are a disruptive

683
00:26:11,690 --> 00:26:09,179
platform under development by one actor

684
00:26:13,029 --> 00:26:11,700
Air Force and they simply don't want to

685
00:26:16,250 --> 00:26:13,039
share

686
00:26:18,289 --> 00:26:16,260
that's a great question I I want to say

687
00:26:20,149 --> 00:26:18,299
that first and foremost personal belief

688
00:26:22,549 --> 00:26:20,159
kind of conviction it's that devout

689
00:26:25,669 --> 00:26:22,559
belief that I believe the vast majority

690
00:26:27,649 --> 00:26:25,679
of UFO or UAP reports whether they be

691
00:26:31,669 --> 00:26:27,659
military or civilian

692
00:26:33,529 --> 00:26:31,679
are indeed misidentifications or

693
00:26:35,810 --> 00:26:33,539
anything benign they're not anything

694
00:26:39,710 --> 00:26:35,820
exotic I've always been of the belief

695
00:26:42,890 --> 00:26:39,720
that a very very small portion of these

696
00:26:45,230 --> 00:26:42,900
reports represent something truly exotic

697
00:26:47,090 --> 00:26:45,240
and really unexplainable I think that

698
00:26:49,430 --> 00:26:47,100
that contributes to the difficulty of

699
00:26:52,370 --> 00:26:49,440
the whole thing because you have let's

700
00:26:54,890 --> 00:26:52,380
say 95 that maybe don't have enough data

701
00:26:56,630 --> 00:26:54,900
maybe it's a distant Bird hats off the

702
00:26:59,450 --> 00:26:56,640
Midwest it's a bird all right or

703
00:27:03,529 --> 00:26:59,460
whatever else and uh but it looked weird

704
00:27:05,690 --> 00:27:03,539
at the time and you you have so much of

705
00:27:08,029 --> 00:27:05,700
that but then you've got this tiny tiny

706
00:27:10,490 --> 00:27:08,039
sliver so it's easier to kind of bulk in

707
00:27:12,649 --> 00:27:10,500
there so I think the vast majority of

708
00:27:14,029 --> 00:27:12,659
those I you know just want to qualify I

709
00:27:15,710 --> 00:27:14,039
think the vast majority of them aren't

710
00:27:17,510 --> 00:27:15,720
anything exotic I think that they are

711
00:27:20,450 --> 00:27:17,520
misidentifications of things that are

712
00:27:23,210 --> 00:27:20,460
much more prosaic in terms of how much

713
00:27:26,149 --> 00:27:23,220
of that really exotic now so maybe let's

714
00:27:27,830 --> 00:27:26,159
talk to things like the Tic Tac or uh

715
00:27:29,510 --> 00:27:27,840
the object that Ryan Graves and the

716
00:27:31,310 --> 00:27:29,520
aviators were seeing off of the East

717
00:27:33,710 --> 00:27:31,320
Coast what is the potential of that

718
00:27:35,870 --> 00:27:33,720
being a U.S Air Force technology or

719
00:27:39,649 --> 00:27:35,880
let's just expand that out to anybody's

720
00:27:42,830 --> 00:27:39,659
technology right yeah China Russia and I

721
00:27:43,789 --> 00:27:42,840
you know I don't I really don't you know

722
00:27:45,649 --> 00:27:43,799
especially when you look at something

723
00:27:48,950 --> 00:27:45,659
like the Tic Tac and the reason that I

724
00:27:52,070 --> 00:27:48,960
say that is I'm very fortunate in that

725
00:27:53,690 --> 00:27:52,080
uh you know working at the debrief you

726
00:27:56,110 --> 00:27:53,700
know not just me but my colleagues Chris

727
00:27:59,029 --> 00:27:56,120
playing Micah Hanks we spend our days

728
00:28:01,909 --> 00:27:59,039
talking to people who are at the

729
00:28:04,370 --> 00:28:01,919
bleeding edge of Technologies so the

730
00:28:06,110 --> 00:28:04,380
ones that that are working on their

731
00:28:08,269 --> 00:28:06,120
research getting ready to published in

732
00:28:11,090 --> 00:28:08,279
in the academic journals or what is the

733
00:28:13,250 --> 00:28:11,100
really the eye the eyebrow raising

734
00:28:15,289 --> 00:28:13,260
Science and Technology you know Chris

735
00:28:16,970 --> 00:28:15,299
just just published a really fascinating

736
00:28:19,789 --> 00:28:16,980
feature today about a new propulsion

737
00:28:21,169 --> 00:28:19,799
system whisper beam technology uh check

738
00:28:22,909 --> 00:28:21,179
it out but that's the kind of stuff that

739
00:28:26,029 --> 00:28:22,919
we're looking at really cutting-edge

740
00:28:29,330 --> 00:28:26,039
stuff and uh you know I just had an

741
00:28:30,649 --> 00:28:29,340
opportunity to to have a really great go

742
00:28:32,210 --> 00:28:30,659
in and have a really good exclusive

743
00:28:35,210 --> 00:28:32,220
interview with the

744
00:28:37,549 --> 00:28:35,220
and get my hands on and get to see the

745
00:28:39,470 --> 00:28:37,559
only true operational trans medium

746
00:28:42,890 --> 00:28:39,480
drones which I'll be doing a feature on

747
00:28:44,510 --> 00:28:42,900
that soon and so oh yeah we'll be able

748
00:28:47,450 --> 00:28:44,520
to we'll be disclosing the department of

749
00:28:49,130 --> 00:28:47,460
defenses is transmedium drones but I see

750
00:28:51,590 --> 00:28:49,140
this technology and I talk to the people

751
00:28:53,450 --> 00:28:51,600
who are working on developing it and you

752
00:28:56,390 --> 00:28:53,460
begin to realize that there is an

753
00:28:58,490 --> 00:28:56,400
enormous gap between the perception of

754
00:29:01,490 --> 00:28:58,500
what people think is potentially

755
00:29:04,010 --> 00:29:01,500
possible and what actually is possible

756
00:29:06,230 --> 00:29:04,020
and so that's where I look at it and go

757
00:29:09,409 --> 00:29:06,240
that something like the Tic Tac that has

758
00:29:11,930 --> 00:29:09,419
no airfoil no control surfaces no no

759
00:29:13,789 --> 00:29:11,940
obvious means propulsion and is able to

760
00:29:16,490 --> 00:29:13,799
instantaneously take off either the

761
00:29:20,090 --> 00:29:16,500
pilots are incorrect somehow uh you know

762
00:29:22,909 --> 00:29:20,100
either four trained aviators engaged in

763
00:29:25,010 --> 00:29:22,919
a mass Collective hallucination which is

764
00:29:27,830 --> 00:29:25,020
a cog psych major I will tell you is

765
00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:27,840
more amazing than aliens because it's so

766
00:29:33,649 --> 00:29:30,960
unlikely that it's impossible or this is

767
00:29:34,970 --> 00:29:33,659
something else because it's not just one

768
00:29:37,190 --> 00:29:34,980
technology that we would have to

769
00:29:39,590 --> 00:29:37,200
overcome to achieve that it's multiple

770
00:29:41,690 --> 00:29:39,600
so we're just not there yet you know

771
00:29:42,610 --> 00:29:41,700
even down to the material science side

772
00:29:47,029 --> 00:29:42,620
of things

773
00:29:50,090 --> 00:29:47,039
we're having a difficult time working on

774
00:29:51,590 --> 00:29:50,100
developing the reusable Hypersonic

775
00:29:53,269 --> 00:29:51,600
platform so the ability to have a

776
00:29:55,250 --> 00:29:53,279
Hypersonic aircraft that's reusable

777
00:29:58,549 --> 00:29:55,260
because the material science isn't there

778
00:30:00,529 --> 00:29:58,559
there withstand those forces that speed

779
00:30:03,110 --> 00:30:00,539
and so I don't I think that some of

780
00:30:05,090 --> 00:30:03,120
those it's just not there and and we do

781
00:30:06,590 --> 00:30:05,100
so even when you see articles from us

782
00:30:08,810 --> 00:30:06,600
rather debrief where we're talking about

783
00:30:10,610 --> 00:30:08,820
you know exotic Advanced propulsion

784
00:30:12,950 --> 00:30:10,620
that's being designed by DARPA or Napa

785
00:30:14,690 --> 00:30:12,960
and we're talking to these people uh or

786
00:30:15,950 --> 00:30:14,700
the trans medium drones we do we talk to

787
00:30:17,930 --> 00:30:15,960
them what do you think about this this

788
00:30:20,029 --> 00:30:17,940
and this and you know they're very

789
00:30:22,310 --> 00:30:20,039
candid and they're like look man you

790
00:30:23,990 --> 00:30:22,320
know let's say in the the warp

791
00:30:25,549 --> 00:30:24,000
technology the people who are really

792
00:30:27,769 --> 00:30:25,559
trying to develop a wardrobe all right

793
00:30:29,570 --> 00:30:27,779
this community is really small we know

794
00:30:31,310 --> 00:30:29,580
each other you know a lot of us work at

795
00:30:33,169 --> 00:30:31,320
different you know Lawrence Livermore

796
00:30:34,730 --> 00:30:33,179
Los Alamos like we work for the

797
00:30:37,610 --> 00:30:34,740
government we all know each other like

798
00:30:40,490 --> 00:30:37,620
man we would know there would be hints

799
00:30:42,590 --> 00:30:40,500
if something like that was even

800
00:30:44,450 --> 00:30:42,600
on the cusp of being possible and

801
00:30:45,950 --> 00:30:44,460
they're like it's just not there yet and

802
00:30:48,590 --> 00:30:45,960
they can give you all the mathematics

803
00:30:50,330 --> 00:30:48,600
and all the reasons why I'm just take

804
00:30:53,149 --> 00:30:50,340
what I hear and go yeah this matches

805
00:30:55,370 --> 00:30:53,159
what everybody else hears and so I don't

806
00:30:57,950 --> 00:30:55,380
you know I think it's a great question I

807
00:30:59,570 --> 00:30:57,960
think it's the most obvious logical when

808
00:31:01,430 --> 00:30:59,580
you're trying to answer something that

809
00:31:04,310 --> 00:31:01,440
really is exotic and doesn't make sense

810
00:31:05,930 --> 00:31:04,320
but I just don't see it I don't see any

811
00:31:07,789 --> 00:31:05,940
of the technology components that are

812
00:31:10,010 --> 00:31:07,799
there to achieve that

813
00:31:12,230 --> 00:31:10,020
yeah I think also what makes the Tic Tac

814
00:31:14,810 --> 00:31:12,240
case so amazing is that it was nearly 20

815
00:31:16,190 --> 00:31:14,820
years ago now so you add that onto the

816
00:31:18,350 --> 00:31:16,200
fact that they're still not the customer

817
00:31:20,029 --> 00:31:18,360
of these Technologies then it's an it's

818
00:31:21,950 --> 00:31:20,039
another data point that really pushes

819
00:31:23,690 --> 00:31:21,960
you far out there that to make it even

820
00:31:28,250 --> 00:31:23,700
more unexplainable

821
00:31:29,690 --> 00:31:28,260
it's it really is I mean that's where

822
00:31:31,430 --> 00:31:29,700
I mean even when you you're you're

823
00:31:34,430 --> 00:31:31,440
considering like they're really

824
00:31:35,510 --> 00:31:34,440
classified stuff you know like people

825
00:31:37,610 --> 00:31:35,520
always always talk about the

826
00:31:39,769 --> 00:31:37,620
unacknowledged special access programs

827
00:31:41,269 --> 00:31:39,779
or the the granddaddy of them all the

828
00:31:42,769 --> 00:31:41,279
waived and acknowledged where the

829
00:31:44,630 --> 00:31:42,779
president signs something off and says

830
00:31:46,070 --> 00:31:44,640
nobody has to know about it we were

831
00:31:47,990 --> 00:31:46,080
talking about those very often we're

832
00:31:50,990 --> 00:31:48,000
talking about operational sap so we're

833
00:31:54,110 --> 00:31:51,000
talking about uh you know there is a bad

834
00:31:55,730 --> 00:31:54,120
guy there's a Russian mobster bad guy

835
00:31:57,470 --> 00:31:55,740
and we've decided we're gonna kill him

836
00:31:59,450 --> 00:31:57,480
but we don't want anybody to know about

837
00:32:01,730 --> 00:31:59,460
it those are a way to use that you know

838
00:32:03,830 --> 00:32:01,740
they're usually not tech technology and

839
00:32:05,330 --> 00:32:03,840
Acquisitions as because depending on the

840
00:32:07,549 --> 00:32:05,340
technology

841
00:32:09,169 --> 00:32:07,559
um you have to spread out you know it's

842
00:32:11,029 --> 00:32:09,179
unfortunate some of the best

843
00:32:14,810 --> 00:32:11,039
technological advances that we've ever

844
00:32:16,909 --> 00:32:14,820
made in the U.S military uh were done by

845
00:32:17,930 --> 00:32:16,919
Skunk Works back in the 50s and 60s but

846
00:32:19,850 --> 00:32:17,940
they were able to do it because it was

847
00:32:22,130 --> 00:32:19,860
everybody in-house you know Kelly

848
00:32:24,830 --> 00:32:22,140
Johnson and like 30 people built the U2

849
00:32:26,389 --> 00:32:24,840
in six months is amazing you couldn't do

850
00:32:28,850 --> 00:32:26,399
that nowadays because you've got all

851
00:32:31,190 --> 00:32:28,860
these other parts that are necessary and

852
00:32:34,190 --> 00:32:31,200
so it's very hard to to Really control

853
00:32:37,310 --> 00:32:34,200
certain aspects of usap but at the end

854
00:32:39,710 --> 00:32:37,320
of the day there's different you know

855
00:32:41,389 --> 00:32:39,720
you're a stealth fighter has all these

856
00:32:43,370 --> 00:32:41,399
different components so you need these

857
00:32:45,350 --> 00:32:43,380
necessary components to go in there and

858
00:32:47,690 --> 00:32:45,360
so those necessary components that go in

859
00:32:49,669 --> 00:32:47,700
there aren't necessarily classified how

860
00:32:51,289 --> 00:32:49,679
they're put them together are and so

861
00:32:53,210 --> 00:32:51,299
when I say that something like the Tic

862
00:32:55,430 --> 00:32:53,220
Tac we don't even see the necessary

863
00:32:59,269 --> 00:32:55,440
components available yet to go into

864
00:33:01,310 --> 00:32:59,279
something like that it's not not there

865
00:33:03,549 --> 00:33:01,320
yeah yeah and you mentioned the U2 there

866
00:33:07,970 --> 00:33:03,559
and we recently saw the cockpit selfie

867
00:33:09,470 --> 00:33:07,980
uh showing the Chinese balloon and uh

868
00:33:11,510 --> 00:33:09,480
why have we not seen any other photos

869
00:33:13,070 --> 00:33:11,520
from these incursions or incidents Tim

870
00:33:16,070 --> 00:33:13,080
what what do you think

871
00:33:19,610 --> 00:33:16,080
I don't that's weird and I'm glad that

872
00:33:21,590 --> 00:33:19,620
you brought that up because you know I

873
00:33:23,450 --> 00:33:21,600
talked to people who I know and trust

874
00:33:25,070 --> 00:33:23,460
very well who who work in the

875
00:33:27,169 --> 00:33:25,080
intelligence Community who have access

876
00:33:28,490 --> 00:33:27,179
to the reports that came with it so they

877
00:33:30,230 --> 00:33:28,500
weren't involved in the analysis or

878
00:33:32,210 --> 00:33:30,240
directly in these incidents but they see

879
00:33:34,130 --> 00:33:32,220
kind of the after paperwork because that

880
00:33:35,690 --> 00:33:34,140
follows into the airline and so they

881
00:33:37,669 --> 00:33:35,700
they told me hey man I really think

882
00:33:39,889 --> 00:33:37,679
these are just balloons most like the

883
00:33:43,549 --> 00:33:39,899
hobbyist balloons you know we reported

884
00:33:45,950 --> 00:33:43,559
on it that uh at least one perhaps all

885
00:33:48,289 --> 00:33:45,960
of them were detected of admitting rfvf

886
00:33:49,909 --> 00:33:48,299
radio frequencies and so that's

887
00:33:52,190 --> 00:33:49,919
consistent with hobby balloons and all

888
00:33:54,649 --> 00:33:52,200
this but at the same time

889
00:33:58,669 --> 00:33:54,659
there is still this weird air of secrecy

890
00:34:00,649 --> 00:33:58,679
about it namely the videos you know the

891
00:34:03,409 --> 00:34:00,659
images that they haven't shared with it

892
00:34:05,330 --> 00:34:03,419
and I just recently found it I say that

893
00:34:07,250 --> 00:34:05,340
I'll be sharing this for the first time

894
00:34:09,109 --> 00:34:07,260
Vinnie right here

895
00:34:12,050 --> 00:34:09,119
um you know I found out uh without any

896
00:34:15,109 --> 00:34:12,060
Shadow doubt they have not shown uh

897
00:34:16,490 --> 00:34:15,119
Congress any videos they have not shown

898
00:34:18,649 --> 00:34:16,500
the Senate armed services or

899
00:34:19,970 --> 00:34:18,659
intelligence committee videos of these

900
00:34:21,770 --> 00:34:19,980
objects

901
00:34:25,369 --> 00:34:21,780
prior to shoot down a dirty shoot down

902
00:34:27,889 --> 00:34:25,379
they have not shown them whatsoever I

903
00:34:31,250 --> 00:34:27,899
can say that for an absolute fact

904
00:34:34,550 --> 00:34:31,260
that's weird and those lawmakers said

905
00:34:37,129 --> 00:34:34,560
that's weird that is odd why won't they

906
00:34:39,649 --> 00:34:37,139
why won't they show us I don't have an

907
00:34:41,750 --> 00:34:39,659
answer for that I have some theories you

908
00:34:44,570 --> 00:34:41,760
know the first Theory goes to the

909
00:34:47,030 --> 00:34:44,580
mundane which is there is political

910
00:34:48,349 --> 00:34:47,040
pressures behind this that these if they

911
00:34:50,089 --> 00:34:48,359
show these videos it's going to look

912
00:34:52,070 --> 00:34:50,099
like a Mickey Mouse balloon that got

913
00:34:54,710 --> 00:34:52,080
loose from the Macy's day Thanksgiving

914
00:34:56,210 --> 00:34:54,720
Parade it's gonna be embarrassing for

915
00:34:58,010 --> 00:34:56,220
the White House and the current

916
00:34:59,690 --> 00:34:58,020
executive administration because I

917
00:35:02,510 --> 00:34:59,700
wanted to shoot this down you know this

918
00:35:05,390 --> 00:35:02,520
was obviously a politically motivated uh

919
00:35:09,230 --> 00:35:05,400
move so there's that you know I think

920
00:35:10,849 --> 00:35:09,240
that that is not entirely crazy and even

921
00:35:13,130 --> 00:35:10,859
you know people within Congress have

922
00:35:14,990 --> 00:35:13,140
said that that could be because you do

923
00:35:16,310 --> 00:35:15,000
you know then you show it to a committee

924
00:35:18,650 --> 00:35:16,320
there are Republicans Democrats

925
00:35:20,150 --> 00:35:18,660
everybody from every side's there and

926
00:35:22,130 --> 00:35:20,160
it's hard to share certain things

927
00:35:23,810 --> 00:35:22,140
without it getting out so that's a

928
00:35:25,849 --> 00:35:23,820
possibility

929
00:35:27,950 --> 00:35:25,859
I don't know that I have another one

930
00:35:30,290 --> 00:35:27,960
other than it's weird you know that

931
00:35:34,069 --> 00:35:30,300
there is something odd involved in it

932
00:35:36,349 --> 00:35:34,079
even though everybody who has seen you

933
00:35:38,329 --> 00:35:36,359
know access to those reports on them of

934
00:35:39,829 --> 00:35:38,339
these objects has has said that these

935
00:35:42,109 --> 00:35:39,839
are not object there's nothing in there

936
00:35:44,510 --> 00:35:42,119
that seems peculiar

937
00:35:46,670 --> 00:35:44,520
um but why haven't they released that I

938
00:35:49,910 --> 00:35:46,680
don't know I I do know for a fact that

939
00:35:52,670 --> 00:35:49,920
uh Arrow was not involved they were not

940
00:35:55,069 --> 00:35:52,680
allowed to be involved so they were not

941
00:35:58,849 --> 00:35:55,079
involved in this whatsoever so they

942
00:36:00,349 --> 00:35:58,859
definitely treated it like it wasn't UAP

943
00:36:02,810 --> 00:36:00,359
other than that they haven't shared any

944
00:36:04,550 --> 00:36:02,820
videos which is very online on par with

945
00:36:06,170 --> 00:36:04,560
them so I don't know it's one of these

946
00:36:08,810 --> 00:36:06,180
things that

947
00:36:10,370 --> 00:36:08,820
um I don't know maybe we're gonna maybe

948
00:36:12,829 --> 00:36:10,380
we're gonna have to to start up a

949
00:36:14,930 --> 00:36:12,839
GoFundMe and maybe maybe I'll talk to my

950
00:36:16,910 --> 00:36:14,940
cohorts of the debrief maybe we can pull

951
00:36:19,970 --> 00:36:16,920
some funds together and go on an

952
00:36:21,230 --> 00:36:19,980
expedition up to Alaska and I tried to I

953
00:36:22,910 --> 00:36:21,240
try to send MJ out there to the

954
00:36:25,370 --> 00:36:22,920
Wilderness he's in Canada to go try to

955
00:36:27,230 --> 00:36:25,380
hunt down that one but you know I don't

956
00:36:30,650 --> 00:36:27,240
know it's

957
00:36:32,630 --> 00:36:30,660
it's weird I agree that it's weird it's

958
00:36:34,910 --> 00:36:32,640
even weird that the US government fired

959
00:36:36,829 --> 00:36:34,920
three missiles over over uh North

960
00:36:39,050 --> 00:36:36,839
America and you know here we are like a

961
00:36:41,630 --> 00:36:39,060
month later everybody's like any who's

962
00:36:43,670 --> 00:36:41,640
you know so what's going on today you

963
00:36:46,010 --> 00:36:43,680
know like it's it's weird it's weird

964
00:36:47,990 --> 00:36:46,020
there's not more pressure there yeah and

965
00:36:49,970 --> 00:36:48,000
I spoke to Ross Coulter recently about

966
00:36:51,470 --> 00:36:49,980
it and he said that there's no one in

967
00:36:53,329 --> 00:36:51,480
the mainstream Media or anything like

968
00:36:54,650 --> 00:36:53,339
that asking the hard questions it's

969
00:36:56,329 --> 00:36:54,660
almost like it's just been left alone

970
00:36:57,890 --> 00:36:56,339
and you know you'd think that people

971
00:36:59,510 --> 00:36:57,900
within Congress or the senate or

972
00:37:01,550 --> 00:36:59,520
somewhere would would be wanting

973
00:37:02,690 --> 00:37:01,560
follow-ups on this but it it just seems

974
00:37:05,329 --> 00:37:02,700
It's Gone Dead

975
00:37:07,910 --> 00:37:05,339
it when I when we you know I ran an

976
00:37:09,890 --> 00:37:07,920
article a couple of weeks ago

977
00:37:11,690 --> 00:37:09,900
because I ask I called them in a guy was

978
00:37:13,550 --> 00:37:11,700
like hey what's going on you know can

979
00:37:16,010 --> 00:37:13,560
you at least confirm that you have video

980
00:37:17,690 --> 00:37:16,020
and they wouldn't and I said well is

981
00:37:19,609 --> 00:37:17,700
there any plans to release video that

982
00:37:22,130 --> 00:37:19,619
you may or may not have they said I

983
00:37:23,870 --> 00:37:22,140
can't tell you so I'm like okay and I

984
00:37:26,870 --> 00:37:23,880
said well has anybody else been asking

985
00:37:28,670 --> 00:37:26,880
you know because I figure okay NBC they

986
00:37:30,109 --> 00:37:28,680
said no not really you know not since it

987
00:37:32,329 --> 00:37:30,119
was initial press conferences and I'm

988
00:37:35,089 --> 00:37:32,339
like because there's only so much one

989
00:37:37,670 --> 00:37:35,099
media Outlet can do sure you know you

990
00:37:40,069 --> 00:37:37,680
know we could call every day and they're

991
00:37:41,810 --> 00:37:40,079
just gonna keep telling us no but uh you

992
00:37:43,730 --> 00:37:41,820
know if multiple Outlets call an

993
00:37:45,710 --> 00:37:43,740
especially bigger Outlets started

994
00:37:47,150 --> 00:37:45,720
calling harassing uh it becomes a

995
00:37:50,450 --> 00:37:47,160
political issue on the other side of the

996
00:37:52,730 --> 00:37:50,460
coin now now you know if if Fox News and

997
00:37:55,069 --> 00:37:52,740
CNN and any of the other big networks

998
00:37:56,810 --> 00:37:55,079
are doing their headline on tonight's

999
00:37:59,510 --> 00:37:56,820
news is why is the government not

1000
00:38:00,950 --> 00:37:59,520
sharing this information that pushes

1001
00:38:02,810 --> 00:38:00,960
them in the corner

1002
00:38:04,250 --> 00:38:02,820
but if it's just the debrief or if it's

1003
00:38:06,050 --> 00:38:04,260
just the debrief and it's just one or

1004
00:38:08,210 --> 00:38:06,060
two other outlets really it's easy to

1005
00:38:09,589 --> 00:38:08,220
ignore and so it is unfortunate and I

1006
00:38:11,510 --> 00:38:09,599
agree with you it is one of these things

1007
00:38:14,510 --> 00:38:11,520
where I'm like it should be a no-brainer

1008
00:38:17,329 --> 00:38:14,520
why why should we not share this or at

1009
00:38:20,030 --> 00:38:17,339
least uh at least give us a a good

1010
00:38:23,750 --> 00:38:20,040
reason as to why and I'm not sure I can

1011
00:38:25,190 --> 00:38:23,760
I can find one out yeah I mean I haven't

1012
00:38:26,630 --> 00:38:25,200
I found the comment earlier but it's

1013
00:38:29,030 --> 00:38:26,640
gone now but Walter here in the chat

1014
00:38:31,970 --> 00:38:29,040
said because it's just an embarrassment

1015
00:38:34,609 --> 00:38:31,980
and I I think that that could be I mean

1016
00:38:37,730 --> 00:38:34,619
and the odd thing is

1017
00:38:39,650 --> 00:38:37,740
I don't think it is because even if you

1018
00:38:42,109 --> 00:38:39,660
shot down the Mickey Mouse balloon you

1019
00:38:45,530 --> 00:38:42,119
remember I'm a defense guy I look at it

1020
00:38:48,770 --> 00:38:45,540
is is is that Russia and China would

1021
00:38:51,530 --> 00:38:48,780
look at that from afar and go okay these

1022
00:38:53,630 --> 00:38:51,540
people are nuts like the threshold that

1023
00:38:56,210 --> 00:38:53,640
they're willing to use missiles and

1024
00:38:58,849 --> 00:38:56,220
forces very very low yeah that's going

1025
00:39:00,530 --> 00:38:58,859
to impact how we interact with America

1026
00:39:02,450 --> 00:39:00,540
like we're we're not going to push the

1027
00:39:04,069 --> 00:39:02,460
envelope as much so to me I actually

1028
00:39:06,950 --> 00:39:04,079
think from a foreign policy standpoint

1029
00:39:08,870 --> 00:39:06,960
if you showed that you shot down you

1030
00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:08,880
know Billy's birthday balloons I think

1031
00:39:13,670 --> 00:39:12,480
that your adversaries go man or a they

1032
00:39:15,410 --> 00:39:13,680
got enough money they don't even care

1033
00:39:18,050 --> 00:39:15,420
they're just firing off Sidewinder

1034
00:39:20,750 --> 00:39:18,060
missiles and B they're willing to do it

1035
00:39:22,490 --> 00:39:20,760
so that's going to influence how we will

1036
00:39:24,650 --> 00:39:22,500
are going how much we're going to push

1037
00:39:27,230 --> 00:39:24,660
States but but I do think at the same

1038
00:39:29,270 --> 00:39:27,240
time because of Politics the other side

1039
00:39:30,950 --> 00:39:29,280
of the political aisle is going to try

1040
00:39:33,410 --> 00:39:30,960
to use that for embarrassment so it's a

1041
00:39:36,710 --> 00:39:33,420
very valid and could be the exact reason

1042
00:39:39,410 --> 00:39:36,720
okay now some photographs that we have

1043
00:39:41,750 --> 00:39:39,420
seen recently coming from Jeremy Corbell

1044
00:39:45,230 --> 00:39:41,760
and George Knapp of this uh Baghdad

1045
00:39:48,109 --> 00:39:45,240
Phantom now allegedly the Air Force had

1046
00:39:50,390 --> 00:39:48,119
designated this as UAP although you know

1047
00:39:52,490 --> 00:39:50,400
that's just word of mouth and I'd say

1048
00:39:56,589 --> 00:39:52,500
what's your overall view of the photos

1049
00:39:59,270 --> 00:39:56,599
the story and not just them but these uh

1050
00:40:01,790 --> 00:39:59,280
alleged other objects being seen over

1051
00:40:04,609 --> 00:40:01,800
active War zones as well

1052
00:40:06,170 --> 00:40:04,619
so okay so the the photo uh you know

1053
00:40:08,030 --> 00:40:06,180
when I first saw it my first thoughts

1054
00:40:09,589 --> 00:40:08,040
was okay yeah and I think he said it on

1055
00:40:11,210 --> 00:40:09,599
Twitter I was like this this is a

1056
00:40:13,730 --> 00:40:11,220
missile this is this is a russian-made

1057
00:40:16,670 --> 00:40:13,740
grand missile you know rocket-propelled

1058
00:40:18,770 --> 00:40:16,680
uh multi-rocket launch system and then

1059
00:40:19,970 --> 00:40:18,780
uh Chris Spitzer who's a good friend of

1060
00:40:21,950 --> 00:40:19,980
mine he's on Twitter he does some

1061
00:40:24,310 --> 00:40:21,960
phenomenal analysis if anybody's looking

1062
00:40:26,750 --> 00:40:24,320
for somebody that does really good

1063
00:40:28,730 --> 00:40:26,760
objective like he's he's one of the most

1064
00:40:30,170 --> 00:40:28,740
objective people I've seen

1065
00:40:32,270 --> 00:40:30,180
um because he knew their swings either

1066
00:40:35,030 --> 00:40:32,280
way but you know he pointed out and I

1067
00:40:37,069 --> 00:40:35,040
believe correctly so the the mode that

1068
00:40:38,990 --> 00:40:37,079
that particular sensor system was in was

1069
00:40:42,290 --> 00:40:39,000
in white hot and the missile or the

1070
00:40:44,390 --> 00:40:42,300
object is is not white it's dark it's

1071
00:40:45,589 --> 00:40:44,400
cold and so that sent me on a little bit

1072
00:40:46,790 --> 00:40:45,599
of a journey to be like yeah you're

1073
00:40:49,190 --> 00:40:46,800
right well what if the ambient

1074
00:40:51,230 --> 00:40:49,200
background behind it is warmer that type

1075
00:40:54,349 --> 00:40:51,240
of thing that could influence it and

1076
00:40:55,970 --> 00:40:54,359
that could be a factor in it but I I you

1077
00:40:57,650 --> 00:40:55,980
know as he correctly has pointed out I

1078
00:40:59,510 --> 00:40:57,660
can't find an example for that and

1079
00:41:01,490 --> 00:40:59,520
speaking to some people they they all

1080
00:41:03,349 --> 00:41:01,500
kind of confirmed it yeah if it is a

1081
00:41:05,690 --> 00:41:03,359
missile So based on the velocity that's

1082
00:41:07,550 --> 00:41:05,700
traveling even if its motor is off now

1083
00:41:09,950 --> 00:41:07,560
it's kind of in Glide it's still

1084
00:41:11,630 --> 00:41:09,960
traveling at a high velocity and it

1085
00:41:13,730 --> 00:41:11,640
should be producing heat it should get

1086
00:41:15,109 --> 00:41:13,740
off a signature and they're like so that

1087
00:41:16,390 --> 00:41:15,119
part of it doesn't look like a missile

1088
00:41:19,550 --> 00:41:16,400
so I'm like

1089
00:41:21,890 --> 00:41:19,560
okay I don't know what it is I did speak

1090
00:41:24,589 --> 00:41:21,900
with somebody who kind of uh gave me

1091
00:41:28,670 --> 00:41:24,599
some really good Intel on what type of

1092
00:41:31,250 --> 00:41:28,680
of Airborne surveillance platform that

1093
00:41:33,230 --> 00:41:31,260
particular uh drone uses which was

1094
00:41:36,530 --> 00:41:33,240
interesting because it uses a

1095
00:41:40,310 --> 00:41:36,540
multi-camera array something like 300 or

1096
00:41:42,109 --> 00:41:40,320
800 lenses that form together they come

1097
00:41:46,010 --> 00:41:42,119
together and give you this really

1098
00:41:47,990 --> 00:41:46,020
massive scene and so they but they are

1099
00:41:49,730 --> 00:41:48,000
taking all of the so each one of these

1100
00:41:53,030 --> 00:41:49,740
little lenses is soaking up everything

1101
00:41:54,829 --> 00:41:53,040
they can then they push it together to

1102
00:41:57,530 --> 00:41:54,839
make it one flush picture that you're

1103
00:41:58,730 --> 00:41:57,540
looking at and they said so potentially

1104
00:42:00,470 --> 00:41:58,740
what you're looking at because they said

1105
00:42:02,870 --> 00:42:00,480
that what I thought initially was the

1106
00:42:04,490 --> 00:42:02,880
the trail the exhaust of a solid fuel

1107
00:42:07,970 --> 00:42:04,500
burning off that you would submit with a

1108
00:42:09,530 --> 00:42:07,980
rocket it tends to look like a artifact

1109
00:42:12,890 --> 00:42:09,540
in the camera system and they said well

1110
00:42:15,109 --> 00:42:12,900
that you can have errors in the system

1111
00:42:16,609 --> 00:42:15,119
you can have errors in the system that

1112
00:42:18,290 --> 00:42:16,619
can create these anomalous things things

1113
00:42:21,349 --> 00:42:18,300
that you know they even pointed out that

1114
00:42:23,630 --> 00:42:21,359
that particular system on those Reaper

1115
00:42:26,690 --> 00:42:23,640
drones was even producing

1116
00:42:29,089 --> 00:42:26,700
um ghost triangles ghost artifact

1117
00:42:32,450 --> 00:42:29,099
triangles of all things and the systems

1118
00:42:34,849 --> 00:42:32,460
going back to 2011 2012 and they're

1119
00:42:37,250 --> 00:42:34,859
first implemented and they said that

1120
00:42:38,930 --> 00:42:37,260
could be what it is but at the end of

1121
00:42:41,329 --> 00:42:38,940
the day it's extremely difficult because

1122
00:42:43,069 --> 00:42:41,339
we're only looking at six still shots

1123
00:42:44,930 --> 00:42:43,079
and so that's what makes it hard and I

1124
00:42:47,089 --> 00:42:44,940
think in this particular case that's

1125
00:42:48,530 --> 00:42:47,099
where I will admit I haven't spent a

1126
00:42:50,750 --> 00:42:48,540
significant amount of time on it because

1127
00:42:52,970 --> 00:42:50,760
because I believe there's only so much

1128
00:42:55,550 --> 00:42:52,980
information we can glean from it and I I

1129
00:42:57,829 --> 00:42:55,560
am one of those people who have kind of

1130
00:42:59,870 --> 00:42:57,839
championed against people who are really

1131
00:43:02,150 --> 00:42:59,880
interested in this topic exerting

1132
00:43:04,309 --> 00:43:02,160
tremendous amounts of energy fighting

1133
00:43:06,530 --> 00:43:04,319
arguing over something that's never

1134
00:43:08,750 --> 00:43:06,540
going to get you a conclusion and I

1135
00:43:10,550 --> 00:43:08,760
think that those are one not diminishing

1136
00:43:12,230 --> 00:43:10,560
it's cool they're out there it's

1137
00:43:14,030 --> 00:43:12,240
impressive they're out there because

1138
00:43:15,829 --> 00:43:14,040
they were taken over denied area they're

1139
00:43:18,410 --> 00:43:15,839
taking over foreign airspace this is

1140
00:43:20,030 --> 00:43:18,420
usually closely guarded and so the

1141
00:43:21,170 --> 00:43:20,040
stories behind it go with it they were

1142
00:43:23,750 --> 00:43:21,180
seeing those objects it's very

1143
00:43:26,210 --> 00:43:23,760
interesting not surprising in the least

1144
00:43:28,190 --> 00:43:26,220
I think that that's a very important

1145
00:43:30,890 --> 00:43:28,200
component that's limited a lot of the

1146
00:43:32,630 --> 00:43:30,900
best videos that we've seen going back

1147
00:43:35,089 --> 00:43:32,640
to what Dan mentioned earlier about

1148
00:43:37,430 --> 00:43:35,099
whereabout system best sensor systems

1149
00:43:39,349 --> 00:43:37,440
are they aren't over the U.S you know

1150
00:43:41,569 --> 00:43:39,359
we're not spying on ourselves so the

1151
00:43:44,450 --> 00:43:41,579
best systems are out there over foreign

1152
00:43:47,270 --> 00:43:44,460
areas over denied areas like Iran Russia

1153
00:43:49,010 --> 00:43:47,280
China which that imagery is never you

1154
00:43:50,990 --> 00:43:49,020
know that's the ultra classified that

1155
00:43:52,430 --> 00:43:51,000
doesn't come out and so it doesn't

1156
00:43:54,410 --> 00:43:52,440
surprise me at all that you would be

1157
00:43:56,329 --> 00:43:54,420
seeing these objects in areas where

1158
00:43:59,030 --> 00:43:56,339
you're going to be operating these

1159
00:44:02,390 --> 00:43:59,040
devices you know at any we just heard

1160
00:44:04,190 --> 00:44:02,400
yesterday about the uh the rq9 being

1161
00:44:06,470 --> 00:44:04,200
knocked down by Russia during the close

1162
00:44:09,170 --> 00:44:06,480
intercept over the Black Sea those are

1163
00:44:12,170 --> 00:44:09,180
q9s those Reapers they're up over the

1164
00:44:14,870 --> 00:44:12,180
Black Sea every day 18 hours a day

1165
00:44:16,250 --> 00:44:14,880
they're near 24 hours a day that's where

1166
00:44:17,690 --> 00:44:16,260
you're going to come in contact with us

1167
00:44:20,030 --> 00:44:17,700
things because you're there and you're

1168
00:44:21,589 --> 00:44:20,040
and you're looking and so it doesn't

1169
00:44:24,349 --> 00:44:21,599
surprise me in the least I'll be

1170
00:44:26,510 --> 00:44:24,359
interested to see I just don't know

1171
00:44:29,990 --> 00:44:26,520
how much more information we can get out

1172
00:44:32,390 --> 00:44:30,000
of it and uh and I'm not I'll admittedly

1173
00:44:34,370 --> 00:44:32,400
I'm not reversed on the classification

1174
00:44:36,530 --> 00:44:34,380
behind it I don't know if it was it the

1175
00:44:38,630 --> 00:44:36,540
air force that said it was unidentified

1176
00:44:40,490 --> 00:44:38,640
or whether uh the person who filmed it

1177
00:44:42,349 --> 00:44:40,500
thought it was unidentified I believe I

1178
00:44:44,630 --> 00:44:42,359
heard maybe you can tell me that it

1179
00:44:46,550 --> 00:44:44,640
actually isn't one that was sent to

1180
00:44:50,230 --> 00:44:46,560
Arrow it wasn't something that was sent

1181
00:44:53,150 --> 00:44:50,240
in officially no it wasn't no okay yeah

1182
00:44:54,890 --> 00:44:53,160
it is yeah and I I appreciate your

1183
00:44:56,390 --> 00:44:54,900
answer and I'm not surprised it's just I

1184
00:44:58,670 --> 00:44:56,400
mean it's good to have data keep coming

1185
00:45:01,069 --> 00:44:58,680
out in these things but how much we can

1186
00:45:03,710 --> 00:45:01,079
glean from it that's a different story

1187
00:45:05,450 --> 00:45:03,720
it's just hard any still images like

1188
00:45:07,849 --> 00:45:05,460
that are very difficult you know even if

1189
00:45:10,609 --> 00:45:07,859
it was a still image of a

1190
00:45:12,710 --> 00:45:10,619
Flying Saucer and skinny Bob was waving

1191
00:45:14,210 --> 00:45:12,720
you know people are gonna say well

1192
00:45:16,430 --> 00:45:14,220
that's a hoax or whatever it's very very

1193
00:45:19,130 --> 00:45:16,440
difficult and you really need all those

1194
00:45:21,230 --> 00:45:19,140
kind of details but I understand from

1195
00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:21,240
from Georgia and Jeremy's side of things

1196
00:45:24,530 --> 00:45:22,800
you do have to protect sourcing and

1197
00:45:26,750 --> 00:45:24,540
everything especially you're something

1198
00:45:28,490 --> 00:45:26,760
like that that was my first process oh

1199
00:45:30,890 --> 00:45:28,500
[\h__\h] this gets money in some trouble

1200
00:45:33,589 --> 00:45:30,900
because it is imagery from a denied area

1201
00:45:35,510 --> 00:45:33,599
it is imagery from from a foreign

1202
00:45:37,069 --> 00:45:35,520
country and so

1203
00:45:39,710 --> 00:45:37,079
um you know they have to be very

1204
00:45:41,270 --> 00:45:39,720
cautious there and so you know we've

1205
00:45:44,270 --> 00:45:41,280
been at positions in the debrief where

1206
00:45:45,710 --> 00:45:44,280
we've gotten information we put it out

1207
00:45:47,329 --> 00:45:45,720
there we're like this is what we know

1208
00:45:49,370 --> 00:45:47,339
this is what we got this is what people

1209
00:45:51,170 --> 00:45:49,380
said that's all I can give you we're not

1210
00:45:54,710 --> 00:45:51,180
saying one way or another

1211
00:45:56,210 --> 00:45:54,720
yeah I appreciate it uh now uh another

1212
00:45:57,470 --> 00:45:56,220
story that I don't think was picked up

1213
00:45:59,210 --> 00:45:57,480
on and I think you'll probably agree

1214
00:46:01,430 --> 00:45:59,220
with me on this is John Greenwald

1215
00:46:03,410 --> 00:46:01,440
recently released this uh

1216
00:46:05,809 --> 00:46:03,420
story about a Tic Tac being detected

1217
00:46:08,030 --> 00:46:05,819
using this sentient system

1218
00:46:10,550 --> 00:46:08,040
and

1219
00:46:12,250 --> 00:46:10,560
I think the capabilities were well one

1220
00:46:15,470 --> 00:46:12,260
of the capabilities of this system

1221
00:46:18,410 --> 00:46:15,480
revealed through foil was that it can

1222
00:46:22,370 --> 00:46:18,420
see and detect UFOs so you know what's

1223
00:46:24,530 --> 00:46:22,380
your thoughts on that that was wild I

1224
00:46:26,329 --> 00:46:24,540
mean that and I said that it I didn't

1225
00:46:28,069 --> 00:46:26,339
say it I didn't realize until after I

1226
00:46:31,250 --> 00:46:28,079
said it so I publicly said here that

1227
00:46:33,650 --> 00:46:31,260
there evidently had been a a typical

1228
00:46:35,930 --> 00:46:33,660
Twitter Thrift there perhaps between

1229
00:46:37,250 --> 00:46:35,940
John Greenwald and George Knapp and I

1230
00:46:38,630 --> 00:46:37,260
certainly was not trying to when I said

1231
00:46:40,970 --> 00:46:38,640
that I thought it was most exciting news

1232
00:46:43,490 --> 00:46:40,980
in a while I was like oh great now I'm

1233
00:46:45,589 --> 00:46:43,500
like I'm siding with team John against

1234
00:46:47,750 --> 00:46:45,599
you know George I'm like no no I didn't

1235
00:46:50,089 --> 00:46:47,760
mean that didn't be that so I didn't

1236
00:46:51,950 --> 00:46:50,099
mean that at all I thought it was first

1237
00:46:55,250 --> 00:46:51,960
first thing it was remarkable this came

1238
00:46:56,569 --> 00:46:55,260
out in for you like I was stunned the

1239
00:47:00,050 --> 00:46:56,579
nro

1240
00:47:02,150 --> 00:47:00,060
is such a secretive agency super

1241
00:47:03,710 --> 00:47:02,160
secretive you know they deal with us by

1242
00:47:06,470 --> 00:47:03,720
satellites they deal with all the

1243
00:47:09,170 --> 00:47:06,480
geospatial intelligence gathering and I

1244
00:47:11,990 --> 00:47:09,180
just know I know people that work there

1245
00:47:14,569 --> 00:47:12,000
and it's super secret and so you know

1246
00:47:15,890 --> 00:47:14,579
down to the fact that when I saw it I

1247
00:47:18,050 --> 00:47:15,900
sent it

1248
00:47:20,690 --> 00:47:18,060
um I sent John's article to some people

1249
00:47:22,910 --> 00:47:20,700
I know that that I can either confirm or

1250
00:47:26,690 --> 00:47:22,920
deny that work at some of those agencies

1251
00:47:30,530 --> 00:47:26,700
or perhaps worked with uh you know Arrow

1252
00:47:32,690 --> 00:47:30,540
or the UAP task force and said hey

1253
00:47:34,450 --> 00:47:32,700
what's up with this and the the answer

1254
00:47:36,829 --> 00:47:34,460
was Universal

1255
00:47:39,950 --> 00:47:36,839
all of them said I can either confirm or

1256
00:47:41,870 --> 00:47:39,960
deny anything in that I said okay so it

1257
00:47:43,609 --> 00:47:41,880
I mean that's that means that the

1258
00:47:44,990 --> 00:47:43,619
program's really classified a lot of the

1259
00:47:47,569 --> 00:47:45,000
aspects of something like man that come

1260
00:47:51,349 --> 00:47:47,579
out in foia is really remarkable and

1261
00:47:54,650 --> 00:47:51,359
then for them to see that is really

1262
00:47:56,390 --> 00:47:54,660
remarkable because the nro and I'm you

1263
00:47:59,390 --> 00:47:56,400
know these particular this particular

1264
00:48:01,250 --> 00:47:59,400
capability is obviously classified so we

1265
00:48:03,710 --> 00:48:01,260
don't know all the intimate details of

1266
00:48:08,329 --> 00:48:03,720
it sure I can tell you that the nro

1267
00:48:11,150 --> 00:48:08,339
stuff is good it's really good and and

1268
00:48:14,089 --> 00:48:11,160
so their their ability to see insights

1269
00:48:16,550 --> 00:48:14,099
of objects and understand things is

1270
00:48:18,650 --> 00:48:16,560
good and so the fact that they picked

1271
00:48:20,809 --> 00:48:18,660
that up was remarkable there was some

1272
00:48:22,970 --> 00:48:20,819
language in it about how they could

1273
00:48:24,829 --> 00:48:22,980
detect these types of things in fact if

1274
00:48:27,589 --> 00:48:24,839
somebody requested if there was a formal

1275
00:48:29,930 --> 00:48:27,599
request for them to do you know redacted

1276
00:48:31,609 --> 00:48:29,940
redacted they could do that I could fill

1277
00:48:33,410 --> 00:48:31,619
in some of those blanks there for people

1278
00:48:35,569 --> 00:48:33,420
and what they're getting at is that

1279
00:48:37,130 --> 00:48:35,579
these satellites are passing around the

1280
00:48:39,829 --> 00:48:37,140
earth seven thousand miles per hour

1281
00:48:41,450 --> 00:48:39,839
constantly and the only uh they're only

1282
00:48:43,250 --> 00:48:41,460
able to capture a certain area about 11

1283
00:48:45,910 --> 00:48:43,260
minutes at a time it's about 11 minute

1284
00:48:48,349 --> 00:48:45,920
Windows what they get and there's not

1285
00:48:49,790 --> 00:48:48,359
you know thank God I'd hate to be that

1286
00:48:53,170 --> 00:48:49,800
poor soul that would have to sit there

1287
00:48:55,490 --> 00:48:53,180
at the monitor who's like watching it

1288
00:48:57,230 --> 00:48:55,500
that's not what happens but what happens

1289
00:48:59,569 --> 00:48:57,240
is you have these computer logarithms

1290
00:49:01,190 --> 00:48:59,579
you have ai that's going through all of

1291
00:49:02,809 --> 00:49:01,200
this data for you and it's highlighting

1292
00:49:05,630 --> 00:49:02,819
stuff very similar to how they do with

1293
00:49:07,849 --> 00:49:05,640
the transient star and the mapping and

1294
00:49:09,349 --> 00:49:07,859
everything with NASA uh how it'll

1295
00:49:11,930 --> 00:49:09,359
highlight things for you and you can go

1296
00:49:13,790 --> 00:49:11,940
back and look and so what they're what

1297
00:49:16,849 --> 00:49:13,800
they're getting at there is hey

1298
00:49:19,790 --> 00:49:16,859
if you give us a formal request we'll

1299
00:49:22,250 --> 00:49:19,800
we'll tune up our our gating filters a

1300
00:49:24,410 --> 00:49:22,260
little bit and say Hey give us an alarm

1301
00:49:27,170 --> 00:49:24,420
if you see anything that looks like that

1302
00:49:28,730 --> 00:49:27,180
and again this goes back to what Dan

1303
00:49:30,650 --> 00:49:28,740
first said are we looking at the right

1304
00:49:33,349 --> 00:49:30,660
places are we looking how we should be

1305
00:49:35,450 --> 00:49:33,359
looking and and I said no because in

1306
00:49:37,849 --> 00:49:35,460
certain instances you have to tell these

1307
00:49:40,670 --> 00:49:37,859
systems what to look for you have to say

1308
00:49:43,490 --> 00:49:40,680
no no don't just look for uh you know

1309
00:49:45,710 --> 00:49:43,500
fighter jets naval ships tanks I want

1310
00:49:47,390 --> 00:49:45,720
you to also look for weird stuff you

1311
00:49:48,890 --> 00:49:47,400
know I want you to look for ovals Tic

1312
00:49:51,170 --> 00:49:48,900
Tacs I want you to look for things that

1313
00:49:52,910 --> 00:49:51,180
are moving faster that you normally

1314
00:49:54,530 --> 00:49:52,920
would filter out because it's moving too

1315
00:49:56,210 --> 00:49:54,540
fast or you filter out because it's

1316
00:49:57,770 --> 00:49:56,220
moving too slow we saw that with the

1317
00:50:00,589 --> 00:49:57,780
balloon detection so we changed the

1318
00:50:02,390 --> 00:50:00,599
radar and so I think that's what we're

1319
00:50:04,250 --> 00:50:02,400
getting at there is that they

1320
00:50:06,050 --> 00:50:04,260
essentially said hey we can do that if

1321
00:50:08,150 --> 00:50:06,060
you make this formal request for it

1322
00:50:10,730 --> 00:50:08,160
which is interesting because it appeared

1323
00:50:12,470 --> 00:50:10,740
that they actually picked up this object

1324
00:50:14,089 --> 00:50:12,480
teasing through that reacted document

1325
00:50:15,470 --> 00:50:14,099
they picked up this object because

1326
00:50:17,210 --> 00:50:15,480
somebody was playing with it somebody

1327
00:50:19,250 --> 00:50:17,220
was like hey let me change the gating a

1328
00:50:22,250 --> 00:50:19,260
little bit let me change those bypass

1329
00:50:24,829 --> 00:50:22,260
filters and and whoa hey check it out we

1330
00:50:27,230 --> 00:50:24,839
got this you know here's what we got we

1331
00:50:28,670 --> 00:50:27,240
can make some changes if you asked for

1332
00:50:30,470 --> 00:50:28,680
that so it's really really interesting I

1333
00:50:34,870 --> 00:50:30,480
think it's even more interesting because

1334
00:50:37,190 --> 00:50:34,880
what we can only hope uh I could say

1335
00:50:39,950 --> 00:50:37,200
probably with a high degree of certainty

1336
00:50:42,230 --> 00:50:39,960
that that request was made and that they

1337
00:50:43,670 --> 00:50:42,240
did say yeah this is what we want you to

1338
00:50:45,650 --> 00:50:43,680
look for I want you to look for all

1339
00:50:48,170 --> 00:50:45,660
these shapes that they redacted out of

1340
00:50:50,270 --> 00:50:48,180
that classification she got they won't

1341
00:50:51,890 --> 00:50:50,280
even tell us the shapes and so we have

1342
00:50:55,130 --> 00:50:51,900
to ask ourselves man what did they get

1343
00:50:58,130 --> 00:50:55,140
since then but yeah I think that was the

1344
00:51:00,410 --> 00:50:58,140
that was a very very promising that was

1345
00:51:03,049 --> 00:51:00,420
very promised thing for you so so kudos

1346
00:51:05,750 --> 00:51:03,059
to John and those for for teasing that

1347
00:51:07,730 --> 00:51:05,760
out that was a good pickup yeah indeed

1348
00:51:09,170 --> 00:51:07,740
indeed I just want to say thank you to

1349
00:51:11,510 --> 00:51:09,180
Nick Brown for the five pound donation

1350
00:51:13,130 --> 00:51:11,520
much appreciated he says Richard Dolan

1351
00:51:15,170 --> 00:51:13,140
posted a new video today curious if

1352
00:51:17,329 --> 00:51:15,180
you'd seen it to me it's very important

1353
00:51:18,410 --> 00:51:17,339
he quoted Jack valet's latest book any

1354
00:51:21,049 --> 00:51:18,420
thoughts

1355
00:51:23,990 --> 00:51:21,059
I haven't seen it no I hadn't seen it

1356
00:51:25,430 --> 00:51:24,000
yeah I had it on I had it on today with

1357
00:51:27,349 --> 00:51:25,440
my daughter running around so I didn't

1358
00:51:28,270 --> 00:51:27,359
really pay that much attention to it but

1359
00:51:31,670 --> 00:51:28,280
yeah

1360
00:51:35,210 --> 00:51:31,680
is it a new UA where his new video he

1361
00:51:36,890 --> 00:51:35,220
said so yeah it's Dolan covering some of

1362
00:51:39,410 --> 00:51:36,900
Jacque Valley's latest book but it's

1363
00:51:41,690 --> 00:51:39,420
really focusing on the program that

1364
00:51:44,210 --> 00:51:41,700
allegedly has almost come out three

1365
00:51:46,370 --> 00:51:44,220
times over the past however many decades

1366
00:51:48,470 --> 00:51:46,380
that's what I got from it anyway so okay

1367
00:51:51,710 --> 00:51:48,480
that could be interesting but Nick Brown

1368
00:51:53,870 --> 00:51:51,720
thank you anyway really appreciate that

1369
00:51:55,549 --> 00:51:53,880
um here's a question from Katie from

1370
00:51:57,349 --> 00:51:55,559
earlier uh we're obviously talking about

1371
00:51:59,930 --> 00:51:57,359
secondhand reports but she says a lot of

1372
00:52:01,549 --> 00:51:59,940
UAB reporting seems to be recycling the

1373
00:52:04,069 --> 00:52:01,559
same rumors from potentially the same

1374
00:52:06,170 --> 00:52:04,079
sources diminishing our report quality

1375
00:52:08,870 --> 00:52:06,180
so how do you address this trap the

1376
00:52:10,970 --> 00:52:08,880
debrief great question Katie really good

1377
00:52:13,490 --> 00:52:10,980
question and and it's difficult you know

1378
00:52:17,450 --> 00:52:13,500
I'll first and say

1379
00:52:21,530 --> 00:52:17,460
it's UAP is a difficult subject to

1380
00:52:24,349 --> 00:52:21,540
report on period you know it's not it's

1381
00:52:27,530 --> 00:52:24,359
not necessarily a normal normal topic to

1382
00:52:29,569 --> 00:52:27,540
report on and because of that because

1383
00:52:31,730 --> 00:52:29,579
there's this stigma behind it and so you

1384
00:52:33,349 --> 00:52:31,740
run into these various barriers but then

1385
00:52:34,730 --> 00:52:33,359
you you run into this other problem is

1386
00:52:36,230 --> 00:52:34,740
the people who do want to talk about it

1387
00:52:38,450 --> 00:52:36,240
whether they work in government or out

1388
00:52:40,370 --> 00:52:38,460
or they have some insight is that all of

1389
00:52:43,010 --> 00:52:40,380
us are human beings we all have beliefs

1390
00:52:46,010 --> 00:52:43,020
yeah we it just is what it is we all

1391
00:52:48,290 --> 00:52:46,020
have beliefs that influence how we view

1392
00:52:49,849 --> 00:52:48,300
things and so it doesn't matter how

1393
00:52:53,569 --> 00:52:49,859
credentialed somebody is or whether you

1394
00:52:55,630 --> 00:52:53,579
like them or what position you're in you

1395
00:52:59,089 --> 00:52:55,640
also have to accept that oh man okay

1396
00:53:00,770 --> 00:52:59,099
this person believes this and that

1397
00:53:02,630 --> 00:53:00,780
belief is going to guide what they're

1398
00:53:04,069 --> 00:53:02,640
looking at so it's always really

1399
00:53:05,569 --> 00:53:04,079
imperative I think one of the things

1400
00:53:07,849 --> 00:53:05,579
that we really strive to do at the

1401
00:53:11,510 --> 00:53:07,859
debris is to try to make sure that we

1402
00:53:13,430 --> 00:53:11,520
never single Source anything we never

1403
00:53:16,549 --> 00:53:13,440
report anything that's just coming from

1404
00:53:18,950 --> 00:53:16,559
One Source that and we know that this

1405
00:53:22,130 --> 00:53:18,960
one source has this bias belief system

1406
00:53:25,609 --> 00:53:22,140
right we will somebody will say x y z

1407
00:53:27,049 --> 00:53:25,619
and so we will go uh you know to

1408
00:53:28,609 --> 00:53:27,059
somebody else that we think is probably

1409
00:53:32,150 --> 00:53:28,619
going to have a differing point of view

1410
00:53:35,030 --> 00:53:32,160
you know I haven't reported on UAP very

1411
00:53:37,490 --> 00:53:35,040
very much in the past few months or so

1412
00:53:39,829 --> 00:53:37,500
but but Micah Mike has really covered

1413
00:53:42,290 --> 00:53:39,839
that slack our editor-in-chief and he's

1414
00:53:43,910 --> 00:53:42,300
really into this topic and uh much more

1415
00:53:46,010 --> 00:53:43,920
knowledgeable than me frankly on the

1416
00:53:48,049 --> 00:53:46,020
history of it and everything and so he

1417
00:53:49,490 --> 00:53:48,059
always does a great job and and I love

1418
00:53:51,829 --> 00:53:49,500
that he does this in articles some

1419
00:53:53,390 --> 00:53:51,839
people you know ah you know big grudges

1420
00:53:55,010 --> 00:53:53,400
for it but he'll reach out to Mick West

1421
00:53:58,730 --> 00:53:55,020
he'll get these other different reviews

1422
00:54:02,150 --> 00:53:58,740
so you kind of add that into that and we

1423
00:54:03,829 --> 00:54:02,160
try as hard as possible especially I I

1424
00:54:04,430 --> 00:54:03,839
really try

1425
00:54:07,549 --> 00:54:04,440
um

1426
00:54:09,829 --> 00:54:07,559
to as much as I possibly can that you'll

1427
00:54:13,190 --> 00:54:09,839
notice that when I report on anything

1428
00:54:15,170 --> 00:54:13,200
that's UAP related unless it directly

1429
00:54:16,849 --> 00:54:15,180
involves somebody so unless I'm in

1430
00:54:20,030 --> 00:54:16,859
unless I'm reporting on something that

1431
00:54:21,829 --> 00:54:20,040
directly involves uh Lou Alexander I

1432
00:54:23,210 --> 00:54:21,839
don't talk to Lou I don't call Lou I

1433
00:54:25,549 --> 00:54:23,220
don't care what he has to say about it

1434
00:54:27,470 --> 00:54:25,559
not that I don't like Lou I just I want

1435
00:54:30,470 --> 00:54:27,480
to hear from somebody else we try our

1436
00:54:32,569 --> 00:54:30,480
hardest to gather and listen to the

1437
00:54:35,870 --> 00:54:32,579
opinions or sourcing from people who are

1438
00:54:38,030 --> 00:54:35,880
not quote unquote in the UFO field

1439
00:54:40,370 --> 00:54:38,040
um you know that's that's why it gives

1440
00:54:41,990 --> 00:54:40,380
us we will bring up these UFO questions

1441
00:54:43,370 --> 00:54:42,000
the people we're talking to for other

1442
00:54:45,650 --> 00:54:43,380
things you know this is how it's

1443
00:54:47,030 --> 00:54:45,660
happened with uh like Eric hasseltine

1444
00:54:49,130 --> 00:54:47,040
who is a former

1445
00:54:52,010 --> 00:54:49,140
um Information Technology director for

1446
00:54:54,170 --> 00:54:52,020
for dni you know we try to get those

1447
00:54:56,690 --> 00:54:54,180
kind of sources we try to get people who

1448
00:54:58,670 --> 00:54:56,700
aren't quote unquote UFO people they're

1449
00:55:01,730 --> 00:54:58,680
willing to talk to us about it and give

1450
00:55:02,750 --> 00:55:01,740
us an outside perspective and I think a

1451
00:55:05,150 --> 00:55:02,760
lot of times

1452
00:55:07,730 --> 00:55:05,160
um we're surprised by that I think that

1453
00:55:10,069 --> 00:55:07,740
people do Katie has a very valid point

1454
00:55:11,390 --> 00:55:10,079
of this information loop I think

1455
00:55:12,770 --> 00:55:11,400
sometimes people are afraid to get out

1456
00:55:15,349 --> 00:55:12,780
of that because they believe that if

1457
00:55:16,549 --> 00:55:15,359
they talk to somebody outside of that

1458
00:55:18,650 --> 00:55:16,559
Loop they're going to hear something

1459
00:55:19,970 --> 00:55:18,660
they don't want and frankly in my

1460
00:55:22,430 --> 00:55:19,980
experience has been the exact opposite

1461
00:55:24,170 --> 00:55:22,440
you know it's uh you know Ray maybe it's

1462
00:55:26,270 --> 00:55:24,180
the former Secretary of Navy that was

1463
00:55:28,670 --> 00:55:26,280
really featured in part three of those

1464
00:55:30,650 --> 00:55:28,680
devices of Unknown Origin me and him

1465
00:55:32,030 --> 00:55:30,660
talked about Navy technology the first

1466
00:55:33,829 --> 00:55:32,040
time we met we were talking about

1467
00:55:35,270 --> 00:55:33,839
different Navy Technologies I just

1468
00:55:38,089 --> 00:55:35,280
called him up before hey man talking

1469
00:55:40,190 --> 00:55:38,099
about UFOs and surprisingly he was happy

1470
00:55:42,890 --> 00:55:40,200
with it he was great with it great guy

1471
00:55:45,170 --> 00:55:42,900
uh Eric hasselton's another one so uh

1472
00:55:46,970 --> 00:55:45,180
you know God His Name Escapes me the one

1473
00:55:49,250 --> 00:55:46,980
in trans medium the former assistant

1474
00:55:50,809 --> 00:55:49,260
director of NORAD was willing to talk to

1475
00:55:54,349 --> 00:55:50,819
us about it so you run into all these

1476
00:55:57,470 --> 00:55:54,359
people and to me I think that bolsters

1477
00:55:59,809 --> 00:55:57,480
the credibility that has always kept me

1478
00:56:03,349 --> 00:55:59,819
investigating it because you're able to

1479
00:56:05,329 --> 00:56:03,359
walk away and go okay they aren't just

1480
00:56:07,130 --> 00:56:05,339
speaking from police because they're

1481
00:56:09,829 --> 00:56:07,140
sharing either experiences that they

1482
00:56:12,290 --> 00:56:09,839
generally have what they've had in their

1483
00:56:13,730 --> 00:56:12,300
positions and and and their experience

1484
00:56:15,589 --> 00:56:13,740
with that and then they're going to go

1485
00:56:19,250 --> 00:56:15,599
about their lives like they're not

1486
00:56:23,270 --> 00:56:19,260
really going to stay in the UFO field so

1487
00:56:25,609 --> 00:56:23,280
uh I'm not I'm I'm the the risk is

1488
00:56:28,549 --> 00:56:25,619
greatly reduced that I'm just in an

1489
00:56:31,130 --> 00:56:28,559
information Loop but I think yeah great

1490
00:56:33,170 --> 00:56:31,140
question Katie I think that that is

1491
00:56:36,589 --> 00:56:33,180
problematic I think it is very

1492
00:56:39,710 --> 00:56:36,599
problematic in a lot of UFO Reporting

1493
00:56:41,210 --> 00:56:39,720
but I I don't criticize anybody for it I

1494
00:56:43,849 --> 00:56:41,220
think people just get caught in that

1495
00:56:45,410 --> 00:56:43,859
Loop because it becomes easy you know

1496
00:56:47,930 --> 00:56:45,420
you know if you pick up phone and ask

1497
00:56:48,950 --> 00:56:47,940
Lou or whoever hey you know what did you

1498
00:56:50,210 --> 00:56:48,960
think about this they're going to talk

1499
00:56:52,010 --> 00:56:50,220
to you they're going to give you a quote

1500
00:56:55,430 --> 00:56:52,020
but I think you know it's good to

1501
00:56:57,170 --> 00:56:55,440
cultivate different sources of opinion

1502
00:56:59,030 --> 00:56:57,180
um and you'll be surprised I think the

1503
00:57:00,829 --> 00:56:59,040
joy that's actually how you get new info

1504
00:57:01,849 --> 00:57:00,839
and you bring new stuff to the table in

1505
00:57:03,890 --> 00:57:01,859
my opinion

1506
00:57:06,049 --> 00:57:03,900
yeah great answer thank you I appreciate

1507
00:57:08,270 --> 00:57:06,059
that uh and another case that I wanted

1508
00:57:09,410 --> 00:57:08,280
to just just bring up with you I don't

1509
00:57:10,730 --> 00:57:09,420
know how much we can talk about it

1510
00:57:13,510 --> 00:57:10,740
because there's nothing really about it

1511
00:57:16,490 --> 00:57:13,520
is the 1971 Holloman Air Force Base

1512
00:57:18,290 --> 00:57:16,500
alleged Landing that it just keeps

1513
00:57:19,970 --> 00:57:18,300
coming around again and you know

1514
00:57:22,010 --> 00:57:19,980
everyone gets really excited so I just

1515
00:57:24,109 --> 00:57:22,020
wondered if you had any thoughts on it

1516
00:57:26,329 --> 00:57:24,119
whether it's there's any validity to it

1517
00:57:30,589 --> 00:57:26,339
or anything

1518
00:57:34,630 --> 00:57:32,809
I'm trying to remember

1519
00:57:36,910 --> 00:57:34,640
I better figure out what I can say

1520
00:57:40,130 --> 00:57:36,920
because

1521
00:57:43,670 --> 00:57:40,140
I I you know here's another I can say

1522
00:57:45,170 --> 00:57:43,680
that I am under an NDA related to

1523
00:57:47,809 --> 00:57:45,180
Holloman

1524
00:57:48,829 --> 00:57:47,819
but it's not what you think and it will

1525
00:57:55,190 --> 00:57:48,839
come out

1526
00:58:00,230 --> 00:57:58,069
I you know I don't know okay so for you

1527
00:58:02,450 --> 00:58:00,240
know I've heard that you know I've heard

1528
00:58:04,010 --> 00:58:02,460
different variations of the Holloman

1529
00:58:05,510 --> 00:58:04,020
myth I've heard that Eisenhower maybe

1530
00:58:07,309 --> 00:58:05,520
went out there and shook hands with

1531
00:58:09,950 --> 00:58:07,319
aliens perhaps maybe they met with other

1532
00:58:12,650 --> 00:58:09,960
people perhaps aliens landed I I don't

1533
00:58:14,870 --> 00:58:12,660
know it seems really outlandish to me

1534
00:58:16,490 --> 00:58:14,880
and I don't mean that disrespectfully to

1535
00:58:18,589 --> 00:58:16,500
either the aliens or the people who

1536
00:58:21,530 --> 00:58:18,599
maybe believe that it happened maybe it

1537
00:58:22,670 --> 00:58:21,540
did uh it goes back to kind of

1538
00:58:24,890 --> 00:58:22,680
um where I stand with the crash

1539
00:58:28,309 --> 00:58:24,900
retrievals and stuff so I'm like yeah

1540
00:58:30,950 --> 00:58:28,319
it's a huge Dory we gotta have something

1541
00:58:32,809 --> 00:58:30,960
other than a guy who said a guy I saw it

1542
00:58:35,390 --> 00:58:32,819
or something like that right and so I

1543
00:58:36,650 --> 00:58:35,400
think that uh it's a hard story for me

1544
00:58:41,270 --> 00:58:36,660
to swallow

1545
00:58:42,530 --> 00:58:41,280
reasons that probably might probably

1546
00:58:45,170 --> 00:58:42,540
wouldn't surprise anybody that knows me

1547
00:58:47,569 --> 00:58:45,180
but but it don't come from the UFO field

1548
00:58:50,150 --> 00:58:47,579
which is uh you know I'm an avid World

1549
00:58:52,250 --> 00:58:50,160
War II amateur historian you know very

1550
00:58:54,349 --> 00:58:52,260
big on that of constantly you know

1551
00:58:57,289 --> 00:58:54,359
that's probably my my biggest passion

1552
00:58:59,750 --> 00:58:57,299
arguably is World War II history and so

1553
00:59:01,370 --> 00:58:59,760
I've done you know I've read a lot I

1554
00:59:03,289 --> 00:59:01,380
feel like I know Dwight D Eisenhower

1555
00:59:05,150 --> 00:59:03,299
like he was my grandfather

1556
00:59:08,210 --> 00:59:05,160
and so I know kind of his personality

1557
00:59:10,130 --> 00:59:08,220
and everything and he knowing all of

1558
00:59:11,809 --> 00:59:10,140
that I find it very hard to believe that

1559
00:59:13,730 --> 00:59:11,819
Dwight Eisenhower would have met with

1560
00:59:15,829 --> 00:59:13,740
aliens and not shared that

1561
00:59:18,650 --> 00:59:15,839
right with the public just knowing who

1562
00:59:21,109 --> 00:59:18,660
he was as a as a person as a leader as a

1563
00:59:25,130 --> 00:59:21,119
president as an Allied Commander he was

1564
00:59:27,770 --> 00:59:25,140
just very well known as is a rare person

1565
00:59:30,170 --> 00:59:27,780
of his of any generation that was really

1566
00:59:32,530 --> 00:59:30,180
there for the people and so I have a

1567
00:59:36,710 --> 00:59:32,540
hard time you know he had already

1568
00:59:38,750 --> 00:59:36,720
commanded the allies during World War II

1569
00:59:40,549 --> 00:59:38,760
and he made some of the toughest

1570
00:59:41,750 --> 00:59:40,559
decisions and everything and so this

1571
00:59:43,370 --> 00:59:41,760
idea that you could make the tough

1572
00:59:45,289 --> 00:59:43,380
decision of letting the people know

1573
00:59:47,329 --> 00:59:45,299
about this

1574
00:59:48,890 --> 00:59:47,339
um I just I have a hard time I struggle

1575
00:59:50,870 --> 00:59:48,900
thinking that Eisenhower would have done

1576
00:59:52,670 --> 00:59:50,880
that of course the Counterpoint people

1577
00:59:53,450 --> 00:59:52,680
will say is but the aliens told him they

1578
00:59:54,890 --> 00:59:53,460
could

1579
00:59:56,450 --> 00:59:54,900
well then [\h__\h] I don't want to meet him

1580
00:59:58,089 --> 00:59:56,460
they sound they sound like angry mean

1581
01:00:00,349 --> 00:59:58,099
aliens you know

1582
01:00:02,510 --> 01:00:00,359
they're not friendly

1583
01:00:04,789 --> 01:00:02,520
ah no thank you again I appreciate the

1584
01:00:06,410 --> 01:00:04,799
answer appreciate it listen Tim before I

1585
01:00:07,609 --> 01:00:06,420
let you let you go I just wondered if it

1586
01:00:08,990 --> 01:00:07,619
was anything that you are working on

1587
01:00:14,329 --> 01:00:09,000
that you could tell us about other than

1588
01:00:17,329 --> 01:00:14,339
devices part four no I I a couple of

1589
01:00:20,390 --> 01:00:17,339
things not not necessarily uh UAP

1590
01:00:22,430 --> 01:00:20,400
related but but tangentially I think go

1591
01:00:24,650 --> 01:00:22,440
back into what we talked about in

1592
01:00:26,809 --> 01:00:24,660
answering that question you know what do

1593
01:00:29,809 --> 01:00:26,819
you think it could be secret U.S

1594
01:00:31,490 --> 01:00:29,819
technology right and that's related to

1595
01:00:33,650 --> 01:00:31,500
advancing Technologies like I mentioned

1596
01:00:35,569 --> 01:00:33,660
I have uh I got to sit down and put it

1597
01:00:37,309 --> 01:00:35,579
on paper it's one of these things we're

1598
01:00:39,109 --> 01:00:37,319
just joking about it but with my good

1599
01:00:41,030 --> 01:00:39,119
buddy and colleague Christopher plane

1600
01:00:42,770 --> 01:00:41,040
where I'm like man I just got into this

1601
01:00:44,089 --> 01:00:42,780
because I like solving Mysteries or I

1602
01:00:46,609 --> 01:00:44,099
like figuring stuff out or I'm

1603
01:00:48,770 --> 01:00:46,619
insatiably curious I don't want to write

1604
01:00:51,109 --> 01:00:48,780
it down and share with people screw

1605
01:00:52,910 --> 01:00:51,119
everybody up you know for myself I gotta

1606
01:00:54,770 --> 01:00:52,920
put it on paper but I did have an

1607
01:00:57,289 --> 01:00:54,780
opportunity to get some really great

1608
01:01:00,470 --> 01:00:57,299
exclusives when it relates to

1609
01:01:04,190 --> 01:01:00,480
um a legitimate transmedium technology

1610
01:01:06,710 --> 01:01:04,200
that's real she didn't happen this is

1611
01:01:08,809 --> 01:01:06,720
not junk this this is something that is

1612
01:01:10,250 --> 01:01:08,819
disruptive and so that I think is really

1613
01:01:13,609 --> 01:01:10,260
cool that's something I'll be working on

1614
01:01:14,829 --> 01:01:13,619
publishing out there there's he's so

1615
01:01:19,370 --> 01:01:14,839
stupid

1616
01:01:21,349 --> 01:01:19,380
uh I'm working on another really cool uh

1617
01:01:23,930 --> 01:01:21,359
military medical technology that relates

1618
01:01:26,750 --> 01:01:23,940
to augmented reality and how saving

1619
01:01:29,450 --> 01:01:26,760
soldiers lives on the battlefield uh a

1620
01:01:30,950 --> 01:01:29,460
world away which is just phenomenal

1621
01:01:33,049 --> 01:01:30,960
um I mean that's the fun about what we

1622
01:01:34,910 --> 01:01:33,059
do at the debrief I think is that we get

1623
01:01:37,130 --> 01:01:34,920
to look at the inside and we we don't

1624
01:01:39,170 --> 01:01:37,140
get to see the the silliness that you

1625
01:01:41,210 --> 01:01:39,180
know chat gbt is not going to kill us

1626
01:01:44,210 --> 01:01:41,220
all it's not going to take us over we

1627
01:01:47,450 --> 01:01:44,220
get to see how people are applying Ai

1628
01:01:49,849 --> 01:01:47,460
and AR and VR Technologies and drone

1629
01:01:52,190 --> 01:01:49,859
Technologies and they're really

1630
01:01:53,510 --> 01:01:52,200
going to change the world like for good

1631
01:01:55,190 --> 01:01:53,520
like there's things that we're seeing

1632
01:01:57,349 --> 01:01:55,200
that are really good Israeli Jones story

1633
01:01:59,390 --> 01:01:57,359
just did was amazing what they're able

1634
01:02:02,809 --> 01:01:59,400
to do with those and so I do have some

1635
01:02:05,630 --> 01:02:02,819
of that kind of lined up and so we'll be

1636
01:02:08,510 --> 01:02:05,640
bringing that forward and uh

1637
01:02:10,069 --> 01:02:08,520
figure out what I always got UAP stuff

1638
01:02:11,690 --> 01:02:10,079
that's kind of simmering you know

1639
01:02:13,670 --> 01:02:11,700
there's always something simmering on

1640
01:02:15,650 --> 01:02:13,680
the stove when it relates to UAP because

1641
01:02:17,270 --> 01:02:15,660
I know that's what most of the audience

1642
01:02:18,849 --> 01:02:17,280
will be interested in so that's always

1643
01:02:21,410 --> 01:02:18,859
simmering you know

1644
01:02:23,450 --> 01:02:21,420
keep on the lookout for that but I I

1645
01:02:25,430 --> 01:02:23,460
would also say that uh you know

1646
01:02:28,910 --> 01:02:25,440
hopefully people enjoy the content but

1647
01:02:30,890 --> 01:02:28,920
but do check out what we have even if

1648
01:02:33,589 --> 01:02:30,900
it's not UAP related because I do

1649
01:02:35,089 --> 01:02:33,599
genuinely believe that uh when you read

1650
01:02:37,190 --> 01:02:35,099
the content we're putting out you will

1651
01:02:39,530 --> 01:02:37,200
walk away going you'll be able to have

1652
01:02:41,390 --> 01:02:39,540
more intellectual conversations and

1653
01:02:44,150 --> 01:02:41,400
investigations of you AP because you'll

1654
01:02:45,650 --> 01:02:44,160
be able to say nah no there's no way I

1655
01:02:48,289 --> 01:02:45,660
know because I just read that Battelle

1656
01:02:50,690 --> 01:02:48,299
material institutes is is is working on

1657
01:02:52,130 --> 01:02:50,700
this graphene coding to go over

1658
01:02:53,630 --> 01:02:52,140
Hypersonic vehicles but they hadn't

1659
01:02:55,609 --> 01:02:53,640
developed it yet so don't give me this

1660
01:02:57,170 --> 01:02:55,619
[\h__\h] the Air Force is flying a Mach 10

1661
01:02:59,390 --> 01:02:57,180
jet yet because they can't you know

1662
01:03:01,549 --> 01:02:59,400
you'll be able to answer those things

1663
01:03:05,150 --> 01:03:01,559
and have something behind it other than

1664
01:03:07,069 --> 01:03:05,160
it's not true so we'll we're constantly

1665
01:03:08,750 --> 01:03:07,079
bringing stuff out like that

1666
01:03:10,430 --> 01:03:08,760
I look forward to anything you put out

1667
01:03:12,530 --> 01:03:10,440
and you say that I actually go all

1668
01:03:14,990 --> 01:03:12,540
across all the Articles non-uap related

1669
01:03:16,970 --> 01:03:15,000
even I think your latest one on this uh

1670
01:03:20,809 --> 01:03:16,980
Wormhole technology thing that you put

1671
01:03:23,030 --> 01:03:20,819
off yeah it's really cool yeah no that

1672
01:03:25,370 --> 01:03:23,040
was really I mean that's the stuff I

1673
01:03:28,370 --> 01:03:25,380
mean that that's the most fun about what

1674
01:03:30,770 --> 01:03:28,380
I do honestly Vinnie is and all of a

1675
01:03:32,569 --> 01:03:30,780
sudden UAP isn't weird anymore because

1676
01:03:34,970 --> 01:03:32,579
when you start talking and you see with

1677
01:03:37,490 --> 01:03:34,980
the real science and the real Tech is

1678
01:03:38,750 --> 01:03:37,500
being developed and they explain it much

1679
01:03:40,309 --> 01:03:38,760
greater terms but when you're sitting

1680
01:03:42,650 --> 01:03:40,319
there and somebody's saying look here's

1681
01:03:44,930 --> 01:03:42,660
all the math and all the proof that you

1682
01:03:47,630 --> 01:03:44,940
know this wormholes can be created and

1683
01:03:49,430 --> 01:03:47,640
everything you go well I mean is it

1684
01:03:51,829 --> 01:03:49,440
really weird to think that somebody else

1685
01:03:54,530 --> 01:03:51,839
had perfected this and visiting is that

1686
01:03:57,170 --> 01:03:54,540
crazy uh because it's not crazy this

1687
01:03:58,430 --> 01:03:57,180
exists so yeah no that's that's really

1688
01:04:00,109 --> 01:03:58,440
cool

1689
01:04:01,849 --> 01:04:00,119
um yeah yeah I always get excited

1690
01:04:03,049 --> 01:04:01,859
because Chris Chris playing who's

1691
01:04:04,970 --> 01:04:03,059
sitting here tell me I'm working on

1692
01:04:07,309 --> 01:04:04,980
insane stuff he's the one who always

1693
01:04:08,809 --> 01:04:07,319
keeps me motivated because he's he's I

1694
01:04:10,670 --> 01:04:08,819
think he goes to lunch and parties with

1695
01:04:12,770 --> 01:04:10,680
these propulsion nerds like he's got

1696
01:04:14,930 --> 01:04:12,780
stuff and Chris is Chris has probably

1697
01:04:16,190 --> 01:04:14,940
got a portfolio of aerospace companies

1698
01:04:17,630 --> 01:04:16,200
he's not telling us about he's gonna be

1699
01:04:21,109 --> 01:04:17,640
a billionaire because he's investing in

1700
01:04:22,849 --> 01:04:21,119
these Tech Giants and uh but it's cool

1701
01:04:24,230 --> 01:04:22,859
stuff man there is it's really really

1702
01:04:26,569 --> 01:04:24,240
cool stuff

1703
01:04:28,190 --> 01:04:26,579
that's great listen Tim thank you so

1704
01:04:29,930 --> 01:04:28,200
much absolutely wonderful conversation

1705
01:04:32,270 --> 01:04:29,940
it's always an absolute pleasure to

1706
01:04:34,250 --> 01:04:32,280
speak with you uh and to everybody in

1707
01:04:35,630 --> 01:04:34,260
the chat thank you guys as well I'll be

1708
01:04:37,910 --> 01:04:35,640
back next week with Katie where we'll

1709
01:04:40,549 --> 01:04:37,920
have Dr Gary Nolan and Tyler Henry

1710
01:04:42,410 --> 01:04:40,559
together for an interesting conversation

1711
01:04:44,630 --> 01:04:42,420
but yeah once again Tim thank you so

1712
01:04:47,030 --> 01:04:44,640
much no no absolutely man it's been

1713
01:04:49,370 --> 01:04:47,040
fantastic Vinnie I appreciate it

1714
01:04:50,809 --> 01:04:49,380
wonderful okay everyone we'll end it